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Foreword
I spent the first year of my PhD working on a completely different research
project whose results I did not include in this dissertation as I preferred
submitting a unified work. The paper resulting from this research project
is entitled “A Semiparametric Model for the Systematic Factors of Portfolio
Credit Risk Premia” and it is published in the Journal of Empirical Finance,
Volume 16, Issue 4, September 2009, pp. 655-670.
The paper investigates the empirical relationship between the daily returns
of a Credit Default Swap (CDS) index and stock returns, stock price volatil-
ity, and interest rates. Analogous empirical analyses were previously con-
ducted in the literature by Bystrom (2008) and Alexander and Kaeck (2008).
Bystrom (2008) estimated several linear regression models finding a negative
relationship between the daily returns of various CDS indexes, current stock
returns, and lagged stock returns. Alexander and Kaeck (2008) estimated
a Markov-switching model with a low-volatility regime and a high-volatility
regime finding that interest rates, stock returns, and stock volatility have a
stronger linear relationship with various CDS indexes in the high-volatility
regime.
Both in Bystrom (2008) and Alexander and Kaeck (2008) the relationship
between the daily returns of a CDS index and its determinants is assumed to
be well approximated by a unique parametric model over a rather extended
period of time. However, the parametric model describing the relationship
between the daily returns of a CDS index and its determinants is likely to
be affected by instability and sudden shifts over a relatively long period of
time. Instability and sudden shifts in the regression function could result,
for instance, from the smooth evolution of the economic scenario, or from
extreme and unexpected negative developments in the economy. For this
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reason, in our paper the relationship between the daily returns of a CDS
index and its determinants is described by a semiparametric model which
accounts for a nonlinear regression function characterized by inhomogeneous
smoothness properties and unknown number and locations of jumps. The
model is estimated by the adaptive nonparametric techniques introduced by
Spokoiny (1998) and further developed by Cˇizˇek et al. (2009) which consist
in locally approximating a regression function by a simple parametric model
and in selecting the degree of locality of the parametric approximation by a
multiscale local change point analysis.
Our estimation results indicate that from November 2004 to January 2008
the relationships between the daily returns of the considered CDS index and
stock returns, stock price volatility, and interest rates1 were characterized by
relatively long phases of stability interrupted by several sudden and extreme
jumps. The jumps were associated to the downgrade of Ford and General
Motors in 2005, to the slowdown of the US housing market in 2006, and to
the credit crisis started in 2007. Our estimation results also suggest that
in normal economic conditions the relationship between the daily returns of
the considered CDS index and its determinants tends to be relatively weak
but coherent with economic intuition and with earlier empirical findings,
while during periods of economic instability the relationship between the
daily returns of the CDS index and its determinants tends to be stronger
but often inconsistent with common economic intuition and with earlier em-
1The considered CDS index is the iTraxx Europe index. The iTraxx Europe is the
benchmark credit index in Europe and it is constructed as an equally weighted portfolio
of 125 liquidly traded single-name CDS’s. The considered stock returns are the daily
returns of the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index. The Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 is a blue-
chip index and it is constructed as a portfolio of 50 stocks weighted according to their
market capitalization and representative of different Eurozone countries. The considered
proxy for stock volatility is the Dow Jones VStoxx 50 index. The Dow Jones VStoxx 50
index measures the volatility implied in options on the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index.
The considered interest rate variable is the Euro swap rate versus Euribor for 1-year
maturity.
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pirical findings as it tends to reflect the prevailing circumstances of economic
distress.
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Abstract
In this dissertation we study the indifference buyer’s price and the indiffer-
ence seller’s price of an uncertainty averse decision-maker and the charac-
terization of a decision-maker’s attitudes toward uncertainty.
In the first part of the dissertation we study the properties fulfilled by the
indifference buyer’s price and by the indifference seller’s price of an uncer-
tainty averse decision-maker. We find that the indifference buyer’s price
is a quasiconvex risk measure and that the indifference seller’s price is a
cash-additive convex risk measure. We identify the acceptance family of the
indifference buyer’s price as well as the acceptance set of the indifference
seller’s price. We characterize the dual representations of the indifference
buyer’s price and of the indifference seller’s price both in terms of probabil-
ity charges and in terms of probability measures.
In the second part of the dissertation we study the characterization of a
decision-maker’s attitudes toward uncertainty in terms of the indifference
buyer’s price and of the indifference seller’s price. We find that a decision-
maker is more uncertainty averse than another if and only if her indifference
buyer’s price and her indifference seller’s price are larger than for the other.
We find that a decision-maker is increasingly (respectively, decreasingly, con-
stantly) uncertainty averse if and only if her indifference buyer’s price and
her indifference seller’s price are increasing (respectively, decreasing, con-
stant) functions of her constant initial wealth.
In the last part of the dissertation we further develop the characterization
of increasing, decreasing, and constant uncertainty aversion and we derive
a technical condition that allows to immediately verify whether an uncer-
tainty averse representation of preferences exhibits increasing, decreasing, or
constant uncertainty aversion. We find that this technical condition allows
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to classify a large class of uncertainty averse representations of preferences
into increasingly, decreasingly, and constantly uncertainty averse.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The indifference prices are the boundaries delimiting the prices of a contract
that would be agreed to by an individual who prefers more money to less
money and who endeavors to maximize the relative desirability of her mon-
etary endowment. The technique of indifference pricing was introduced by
Bernoulli (1738) contextually with the prediction that an individual chooses,
among alternative monetary endowments, the one providing a maximum of
expected utility. The consistency of the paradigm of expected utility maxi-
mization and, accordingly, of the resulting indifference prices, with criteria
of logic and rationality, was established by von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1953) in a framework in which future events are assigned objective prob-
abilities, and extended by Savage (1972) to a framework in which future
events are assigned subjective probabilities (see also Ramsey (1931) and de
Finetti (1964)).
The technique of indifference pricing was further developed by Pratt (1964)
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in relation to the characterization of an individual’s attitudes toward risk.
In Pratt (1964) risk is intended as the variability of the outcomes of a mon-
etary prospect, irrespective of whether the different possible outcomes of
the monetary prospect are described by objective probabilities as in von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) or by subjective probabilities as in Sav-
age (1972). Pratt (1964) found that an individual is more risk averse than
another if and only if the maximum price that she would offer to avoid a
risky monetary prospect is larger than for the other, and that an individ-
ual is increasingly (respectively, decreasingly, constantly) risk averse if and
only if the maximum price that she would offer to avoid a risky monetary
prospect is an increasing (respectively, decreasing, constant) function of her
constant initial wealth. Pratt (1964) further observed that an individual is
more risk averse than another if and only if the degree of relative convexity
of her utility function (de Finetti (1952), Arrow (1970) and Pratt (1964))
is larger than for the other, and that an individual is increasingly (respec-
tively, decreasingly, constantly) risk averse if and only the degree of relative
convexity of her utility function is an increasing (respectively, decreasing,
constant) function of her constant initial wealth. Pratt (1964) showed that
the characterization of increasing, decreasing and constant risk aversion in
terms of the degree of relative convexity of a utility function (de Finetti
(1952)) or Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion (Arrow (1970) and Pratt
(1964)) allows to immediately classify the different possible specifications of
a utility function into increasingly, decreasingly, and constantly risk averse.
The indifference prices of an expected utility maximizer, intended indiffer-
ently either in the sense of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) or in
the sense of Savage (1972), have been extensively applied in the actuarial
mathematics literature on premium calculation principles (see, among oth-
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ers, Bu¨hlmann (1970) and Deprez and Gerber (1985)), and in the financial
mathematics literature on pricing in incomplete markets (see, for instance,
Carmona (2009) and the references therein). Ellsberg (1961) observed that,
however, individuals do not always act consistently with the maximization
of expected utility1. Ellsberg (1961) observed that, specifically, if an indi-
vidual considers herself considerably ignorant of the relative frequencies of
future events, and if she dislikes her state of considerable ignorance of the
relative frequencies of future events, then “it is impossible to find probability
numbers in terms of which [... her] choices could be described - even roughly
or approximately - as maximizing the mathematical expectation of utility”.
Schmeidler (1989) indicated that the violation of the paradigm of expected
utility maximization in the particular situations described by Ellsberg (1961)
is consistent with a disfavor for the choices involving subjective rather than
objective probabilities. Schmeidler (1989) designated an individual’s disfa-
vor for the choices involving subjective rather than objective probabilities as
uncertainty aversion, and showed that the choices of an uncertainty averse
individual could be described as maximizing an objective function which
is more general than the mathematical expectation of utility. Schmeidler
(1989) showed that, in particular, the choices of an uncertainty averse in-
dividual could be described as maximizing the integral of the utility with
respect to a capacity or non-additive probability. Since the seminal paper
of Schmeidler (1989), several other objective functions have been proposed
in the literature to describe the choices of an uncertainty averse individual.
Examples are the multiple priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)), the mul-
tiplier (Hansen and Sargent (2001), Strzalecki (2011)) and the variational
1Other deviations from the paradigm of expected utility maximization different from
the one described by Ellsberg (1961) were discovered, for instance, by Allais (1953). This
dissertation is concerned, however, only with the violations of expected utility theory
observed by Ellsberg (1961), and not also with the ones observed by Allais (1953).
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(Maccheroni et al. (2006)) representations of preferences. Cerreia Vioglio
et al. (2011a) showed that, however, many objective functions which de-
scribe the choices of an uncertainty averse individual are particular cases of
a more general objective function which, because of its unifying character,
was denominated by Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a) the uncertainty averse
representation of preferences.
In this dissertation we study the indifference prices defined by the uncer-
tainty averse representation of preferences of Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a)
and their relationship with the characterization of an individual’s attitudes
toward uncertainty.
In Chapter 2 we introduce the uncertainty averse representation of prefer-
ences of Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a) along with its particular specifica-
tions corresponding to the variational (Maccheroni et al. (2006)), the multi-
plier (Hansen and Sargent (2001), Strzalecki (2011)) and the multiple priors
(Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)) representations of preferences.
In Chapter 3 we study the indifference prices defined by the uncertainty
averse representation of preferences of Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a). We
define the indifference buyer’s price as the maximum price that an uncer-
tainty averse individual would offer to avoid an uncertain monetary prospect,
and the indifference seller’s price as the minimum price that an uncertainty
averse individual would demand to accept an uncertain monetary prospect.
We show that the indifference buyer’s price is a quasiconvex risk measure,
and that the indifference seller’s price is a cash-additive convex risk mea-
sure. We study the relationship between the indifference buyer’s price and
its acceptance family, as well as the relationship between the indifference
seller’s price and its acceptance set. We provide the dual representations
of the indifference buyer’s price and of the indifference seller’s price both
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on probability charges and on probability measures. We further develop the
dual representations on probability measures of the indifference buyer’s price
and of the indifference seller’s price defined in terms of the variational (Mac-
cheroni et al. (2006)), the multiplier (Hansen and Sargent (2001), Strzalecki
(2011)) and the multiple priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)) representa-
tions of preferences.
In Chapter 4 we study the characterization of an individual’s attitudes to-
ward uncertainty in terms of the indifference buyer’s price and of the in-
difference seller’s price defined by the uncertainty averse representation of
preferences of Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a). We show that a decision-
maker is more uncertainty averse than another if and only if her indifference
buyer’s price and her indifference seller’s price are larger than for the other,
and that a decision-maker is increasingly (respectively, decreasingly, con-
stantly) uncertainty averse if and only if her indifference buyer’s price and
her indifference seller’s price are increasing (respectively, decreasing, con-
stant) functions of her constant initial wealth. We find a correspondence
between increasing, decreasing, and constant uncertainty aversion and the
additive properties that the indifference buyer’s price satisfies with respect
to the positive constants (e.g. cash-subadditivity (El Karoui and Ravanelli
(2009))), and we show that these additive properties fulfilled by the in-
difference buyer’s price allow to immediately establish various inequalities
between the indifference buyer’s price and the indifference seller’s price. We
find a correspondence between increasing, decreasing, and constant uncer-
tainty aversion and the multiplicative properties that the uncertainty index
appearing in the uncertainty averse representation of preferences of Cer-
reia Vioglio et al. (2011a) satisfies with respect to the positive constants
(e.g. star-shapedness (Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2010))), and we show that
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these multiplicative properties fulfilled by the uncertainty index allow to
immediately classify the different possible specifications of the uncertainty
averse representation of preferences of Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a) into
increasingly, decreasingly, and constantly uncertainty averse. We find that
the variational (Maccheroni et al. (2006)) and, as a consequence, the mul-
tiplier (Hansen and Sargent (2001), Strzalecki (2011)), representations of
preferences are decreasingly uncertainty averse, and that the multiple priors
(Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)) representation of preferences is constantly
uncertainty averse.
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Chapter 2
Decision-Theoretic Framework
2.1 Notations and Basic Concepts
2.1.1 Mathematical Notations
The pair (S,Σ) is a measurable space where S is a set of future states of
nature and Σ is a σ-algebra of subsets of S representing future events.
The set X = B(S,Σ) is the set of all bounded, real-valued, Σ-measurable
functions X on S, including the constant functions X(s) = x ∈ R for all
s ∈ S. The subset of constant functions in X is identified with R and every
equality or inequality involving elements of X is intended as holding for all
s ∈ S.
The set X ∗ = ba(S,Σ) is the set of all bounded, finitely additive, real-valued
set functions P on Σ and X ∗σ = ca(S,Σ) ⊂ X ∗ is its subset of countably
additive elements. A set function P on Σ is finitely additive if P (∪ni=1Ei) =∑n
i=1 P (Ei) for every finite family {Ei}ni=1 of pairwise disjoint sets in Σ
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and it is countably additive if P (∪∞i=1Ei) =
∑∞
i=1 P (Ei) for every countable
family {Ei}i∈N of pairwise disjoint sets in Σ. The set of positive normalized
set functions in X ∗ is indicated by,
∆ := {P ∈ X ∗ |P (E) ≥ 0 ∀E ∈ Σ, P (S) = 1}
and the subset of countably additive elements in ∆ ⊂ X ∗ is indicated by
∆σ ⊂ X ∗σ .
The sets X and X ∗ endowed, respectively, with the supremum norm1 and
with the total variational norm2, are Banach spaces. The space X ∗ is iden-
tified with the dual space of X and the evaluation duality is given by,
EP [X] :=
∫
S
X(s)P (ds)
for all (X,P ) ∈ X × X ∗. Unless otherwise specified, X is endowed with its
norm topology, X ∗ is endowed with its weak∗ topology, and product spaces
are endowed with their product topology. For the definitions of the different
topologies see Aliprantis and Border (2006, Chapter 2).
2.1.2 A Note on Terminology
In the terminology of measure theory the elements of ∆ ⊂ X ∗ are probability
charges and the elements of ∆σ ⊂ X ∗σ are probability measures. In this
dissertation we adopt, however, the terminology of decision-theory, in which
the elements of ∆ ⊂ X ∗ are finitely additive probabilities, and the elements
of ∆σ ⊂ X ∗σ are countably additive probabilities.
1That is, ||X||∞ := sups∈S |X(s)| for all X ∈ X .
2For every E ∈ Σ the total variation of a P on E is defined as ||P || = sup∑ni=1 |P (Ei)|
where the supremum is taken over all finite sequences {Ei} of disjoint sets in Σ with
Ei ⊆ E (see Dunford and Schwartz (1988, III.1.4)).
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2.1.3 Decision-Theoretic Concepts
The considered decision-theoretic set-up is a Savage (1972) framework. The
elements of X are interpreted as monetary payoffs, that is as the alternative
courses of actions that are available to an individual whose consequences are
money payments.
The non-constant monetary payoffs in X are interpreted as entailing “un-
measurable” uncertainty (Knight (1921)) in the sense of having as their “[...]
consequences a set of possible specific outcomes, but where the probabilities of
these outcomes are completely unknown or are not even meaningful” (Luce
and Raiffa (1989)).
The constant monetary payoffs in X are instead interpreted as certain as
they “[...] lead invariably to a specific outcome” (Luce and Raiffa (1989)).
2.2 Background on Uncertainty Aversion
In this section we present the notions and concepts of decision under un-
certainty which were relevant to the study and development of uncertainty
averse preferences. In Subsection 2.2.1 we briefly introduce Savage’s (1972)
expected utility. In Subsection 2.2.2 we describe the violation of Savage’s
(1972) expected utility known as Ellsberg’s (1961) paradox. In Subsection
2.2.3 we describe Schmeidler’s (1989) rationalization of Ellsberg’s (1961)
paradox in terms of a preference for mixtures, averages, or randomizations.
2.2.1 Subjective Expected Utility
According to Savage’s (1972) expected utility theory an individual whose
choices are consistent with some essential principles of logic and are not
intrinsically contradictory evaluates the relative desirability of alternative
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monetary payoffs by a function Uu,Q : X → R of the form,
Uu,Q(X) = EQ[u(X)] (2.1)
for all X ∈ X . The finitely additive probability Q ∈ ∆ in Equation (2.1) is a
subjective probability, prior, or belief (see also Ramsey (1931) and de Finetti
(1964)) reflecting the decision-maker’s personal opinion on the relative likeli-
hoods of future events. The function u : R→ R in Equation (2.1) is a utility
function reflecting the value, utility, or advantage, that the decision-maker
derives from particular monetary outcomes (see Bernoulli (1738) and von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1953)).
2.2.2 Ellsberg’s Paradox
The representation in Equation (2.1) implies that an individual whose choices
are consistent with the normative principles established by Savage (1972)
acts as if she assigned probabilities to future events and as if she chose,
among alternative monetary payoffs, the one providing a maximum of ex-
pected utility. Ellsberg (1961) observed that there are, however, some par-
ticular circumstances in which an individual perceives her information on the
relative likelihoods of future events as considerably opaque, deceitful, or in-
sufficient and, in contrast with the predictions of Savage’s (1972) expected
utility theory, she does not assign, or act as if she assigned, “meaningful
probabilities” to future events.
Ellsberg (1961) discussed, for instance, the following example. Consider an
urn known to contain 30 red balls and 60 black and green balls, the latter
in unknown proportion. One ball is to be drawn at random from the urn.
The “objective” probabilities of a red ball being drawn (R) and of a red ball
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not being drawn (RC) are “completely known” and equal to 1/3 and 2/3
respectively. In contrast, the “objective” probabilities of a black ball being
drawn (B) and of a green ball being drawn (G) are “significantly ignored”.
They are not “completely ignored” because they are known to lie in the
interval [0, 2/3]; there is, however, only little information to judge their pre-
cise values. Ellsberg (1961) investigated how an individual chooses among
the alternative monetary payoffs described in Table 2.1 whose outcomes are
contingent on the colour of the ball drawn from the urn described above.
Ellsberg (1961) observed that most individuals prefer X to Y and Y ′ to X ′
30︷ ︸︸ ︷ 60︷ ︸︸ ︷
R B G
X $100 $0 $0
Y $0 $100 $0
X ′ $100 $0 $100
Y ′ $0 $100 $100
Table 2.1: Urn Example I.
and that “it is impossible to find probability numbers in terms of which these
choices could be described - even roughly or approximately - as maximizing
the mathematical expectation of utility”. Consider, in fact, an individual
who maximizes the expected utility in Equation (2.1) and assume, without
loss of generality3, that u(0) = 0, and that u(100) = 1. This individual
strictly prefers X to Y if and only if Q(R) > Q(B) and strictly prefers Y ′
to X ′ if and only if Q(RC) > Q(BC). Thus, the choices of this individ-
ual reveal that her subjective probability satisfies both Q(R) > Q(B) and
Q(R) < Q(B), which is impossible. For this reason, these findings, as well
3The utility function u : R → R in Equation (2.1) is unique up to positive affine
transformations. Thus, there is no loss of generality in replacing u : R→ R by u˜ : R→ R
where u˜(x) = β + αu(x) for all x ∈ R with β ∈ R and α ∈ (0,+∞) such that α =
1/(u(100)− u(0)) and β = 1− u(100)/(u(100)− u(0)) provided that u(100) > u(0).
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as other analogous findings collected by Ellsberg (1961), are referred to as
the Ellsberg’s paradox.
Ellsberg (1961) further observed that the choice of X over Y and of Y ′ over
X ′ is motivated by a preference for the monetary payoffs whose outcomes are
realized on events whose “objective” probabilities are “completely known”,
as opposed to the monetary payoffs whose outcomes are realized on events
whose “objective” probabilities are “significantly ignored”.
2.2.3 Uncertainty Aversion
Schmeidler (1989) noticed that an individual’s violation of the paradigm of
expected utility maximization in the circumstances described by Ellsberg
(1961) is consistent with a preference for smoothing, or averaging, alter-
native monetary payoffs across states of nature, and that this preference
for mixtures reflects an endeavor to “objectify” the probabilities of the fu-
ture events on which the outcomes of the monetary payoffs are realized (see
Klibanoff (2001)). Consider again the urn described in Subsection 2.2.2 and
assume that an individual is asked to choose among the alternative monetary
payoffs described in Table 2.2. An individual who considers herself consid-
30︷ ︸︸ ︷ 60︷ ︸︸ ︷
R B G
Y $0 $100 $0
Z $0 $0 $100
1
2Y +
1
2Z $0 $50 $50
Table 2.2: Urn Example II.
erably ignorant of the relative likelihoods of the events on which a blue ball
is drawn (B) and a green ball is drawn (G) would be indifferent between Y
and Z, but would prefer their “average” 12Y +
1
2Z to either of them alone:
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while the probability that either Y or Z pays $100 is “significantly ignored”,
as it is only known to lie in the interval [0, 2/3], the probability that their
“average” 12Y +
1
2Z pays $50 is “completely known”, as it is known to be
equal to 2/3.
Schmeidler (1989) designated an individual who prefers a mixture of equally
desirable monetary payoffs to either of them alone as uncertainty averse to
indicate that her choices reveal a preference for the monetary payoffs whose
outcomes are realized on the future events to which probabilities are assigned
“objectively” and a disfavour for the monetary payoffs whose outcomes are
realized on the future events to which probabilities are to be assigned sub-
jectively (see also Klibanoff (2001)).
2.3 Uncertainty Averse Preferences
Although whether uncertainty aversion should be considered a normative
principle of decision under uncertainty or a possibly implausible and irra-
tional trait of particular individuals is still the object of debate (see Al-Najjar
and Weinstein (2009)) several models of choice under uncertainty have been
developed in the economic literature which explicitly postulate uncertainty
aversion of the decision-maker. Examples are the multiple priors (Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989)), the multiplier (Hansen and Sargent (2001), Strza-
lecki (2011)), and the variational (Maccheroni et al. (2006)) representations
of preferences. Other models of choice under uncertainty which allow for
uncertainty aversion of the decision-maker are, among others, the Choquet
expected utility (Schmeidler (1989)) and the smooth ambiguity (Klibanoff
et al. (2005)) representations of preferences.
Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a) showed that all the decision-theoretic models
which characterize uncertainty aversion through Schmeidler’s (1989) prefer-
23
ence for mixtures represent particular cases of a more fundamental class of
preferences which, because of their great generality, were denominated by
Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a) uncertainty averse preferences4. The uncer-
tainty averse representation of preferences Uu,G : X → R of Cerreia Vioglio
et al. (2011a) is given by,
Uu,G(X) = inf
P∈∆
G(EP [u(X)], P ) (2.2)
for all X ∈ X . The function u : R → R in Equation (2.2) is a utility func-
tion (as in Equation (2.1)) reflecting the decision-maker’s attitudes toward
risk. The function G : R × ∆ → (−∞,+∞] in Equation (2.2) is an un-
certainty index reflecting the decision-maker’s attitudes toward uncertainty.
The smaller the uncertainty index G, the larger the decision-maker’s uncer-
tainty aversion. The uncertainty index G : R×∆→ (−∞,+∞] in Equation
(2.2) is increasing on R for each P ∈ ∆, lower semi-continuous and quasi-
convex on R ×∆, normalized, that is such that infP∈∆G(y, P ) = y for all
y ∈ R, and such that G(., P ) is extended-valued continuous on R for each
P ∈ ∆5.
The representation in Equation (2.2) implies that an uncertainty averse
decision-maker whose choices are consistent with the principles established
by Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a) evaluates the relative desirability of an
uncertain monetary payoff in X as if, by the function G, she appraised its
expected utility under each probabilistic scenario in ∆, and as if she summa-
rized her appraisal by considering exclusively the worst probabilistic scenario
in ∆.
4As the Choquet expected utility model of Schmeidler (1989) and the smooth ambi-
guity model of Klibanoff et al. (2005) do not require a priori that the decision-maker is
uncertainty averse, in this dissertation they will not be treated as special cases of the
uncertainty averse representation of preferences of Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a).
5That is, limx→x0 G(x, P ) = G(x0, P ) ∈ (−∞,+∞] for all x0 ∈ R and P ∈ ∆.
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In the following subsections we illustrate that the variational (Maccheroni
et al. (2006)), the multiplier (Hansen and Sargent (2001), Strzalecki (2011)),
and the multiple priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)) representations of
preferences are obtained as particular cases of the uncertainty averse rep-
resentation of preferences of Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a) under suitable
specifications of the uncertainty index G : R×∆→ (−∞,+∞] in Equation
(2.2).
2.3.1 Variational Preferences
The variational representation of preferences Uu,c : X → R of Maccheroni
et al. (2006) is given by,
Uu,c(X) = inf
P∈∆
(
EP [u(X)] + c(P )
)
(2.3)
for all X ∈ X . The function u : R→ R in Equation (2.2) is a utility function
(as in Equation (2.1)) reflecting the decision-maker’s attitudes toward risk.
The function c : ∆ → (−∞,+∞] in Equation (2.3) is an ambiguity index
reflecting the decision-maker’s attitudes toward uncertainty. The smaller
the ambiguity index c, the larger the decision-maker’s uncertainty aversion.
The ambiguity index c : ∆ → (−∞,+∞] is convex, lower semi-continuous,
and normalized, that is such that infP∈∆ c(P ) = 0.
The representation in Equation (2.3) implies that an uncertainty averse
decision-maker whose choices are consistent with the principles established
by Maccheroni et al. (2006) evaluates the relative desirability of an uncer-
tain monetary payoff in X as if, by the function c, she applied a correction
to its expected utility under each probabilistic scenario in ∆, and as if she
summarized her appraisal by considering exclusively the worst probabilistic
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scenario in ∆.
The variational representation of preferences is a particular case of the un-
certainty averse representation of preferences in Equation (2.2) which is
obtained when the uncertainty index G : R×∆→ (−∞,+∞] satisfies,
G(x, P ) = x+ c(P ) (2.4)
for all (x, P ) ∈ R×∆.
2.3.2 Multiplier Preferences
The multiplier representation of preferences Uu,θ,R,P? : X → R introduced
by Hansen and Sargent (2001) and axiomatized by Strzalecki (2011) is given
by,
Uu,θ,R,P
?
(X) = inf
P∈∆
(
EP [u(X)] + θR(P ||P?)
)
(2.5)
for all X ∈ X with θ ∈ (0,+∞] and P? ∈ ∆σ. The function u : R → R
in Equation (2.2) is a utility function (as in Equation (2.1)) reflecting the
decision-maker’s attitudes toward risk. The constant θ ∈ (0,+∞] in Equa-
tion (2.2) is a parameter reflecting the decision-maker’s attitudes toward
uncertainty. The smaller the parameter θ ∈ (0,+∞], the larger the decision-
maker’s uncertainty aversion. The function R(. ||P?) : ∆ → [0,+∞] in
Equation (2.2) is the relative entropy with respect to P? ∈ ∆σ which is
given by,
R(P ||P?) =

EP
[
ln
( dP
dP?
)]
if P ∈ ∆σ(P?)
+∞ otherwise
for all P ∈ ∆. The set ∆σ(Q) ⊂ ∆σ is the set of all probability measures on
(S,Σ) which are absolutely continuous with respect to P? ∈ ∆σ. The prob-
ability measure P? ∈ ∆σ is interpreted as the decision-maker’s best guess of
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the “right” probability on (S,Σ) and it is designated as the decision-maker’s
reference probability (see Strzalecki (2011)).
The representation in Equation (2.5) implies that an uncertainty averse
decision-maker whose choices are consistent with the principles established
by Strzalecki (2011) evaluates the relative desirability of an uncertain mon-
etary payoff in X as if she applied a correction to its expected utility under
each probabilistic scenario in P ∈ ∆, the correction depending on the “dis-
tance” R(P ||P?) of the considered probabilistic scenario P ∈ ∆ from the
reference scenario Q ∈ ∆σ, and on the relevance θ ∈ (0,+∞] that the
decision-maker assigns to this “distance”, and as if she summarized her ap-
praisal by considering exclusively the worst probabilistic scenario in ∆.
The multiplier representation of preferences is a particular case of the un-
certainty averse representation of preferences in Equation (2.2) which is
obtained when the uncertainty index G : R×∆→ (−∞,+∞] satisfies,
G(x, P ) = x+ θR(P ||P?) (2.6)
for all (x, P ) ∈ R×∆.
2.3.3 Multiple Priors Preferences
The multiple priors representation of preferences Uu,P : X → R of Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989) is given by,
Uu,P(X) = inf
P∈P
EP [u(X)] (2.7)
for all X ∈ X . The function u : R→ R in Equation (2.2) is a utility function
(as in Equation (2.1)) reflecting the decision-maker’s attitudes toward risk.
The set P ⊂ ∆ is a set of priors reflecting the decision-maker’s attitudes
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toward uncertainty. The larger the set of priors P, the larger the decision-
maker’s uncertainty aversion.
The representation in Equation (2.7) implies that an uncertainty averse
decision-maker whose choices are consistent with the principles established
by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) evaluates the relative desirability of an
uncertain monetary payoff in X as if she appraised its expected utility under
each probabilistic scenario in P ⊂ ∆ and as if she summarized her appraisal
by considering exclusively the worst probabilistic scenario in P.
The multiple priors representation of preferences is a particular case of the
uncertainty averse representation of preferences in Equation (2.2) which is
obtained when the uncertainty index G : R×∆→ (−∞,+∞] satisfies,
G(x, P ) = x+ δ(P | P) (2.8)
for all (x, P ) ∈ R×∆ and where δ(. | P)→ [0,+∞] is defined by,
δ(P | P) =

0 if P ∈ P
+∞ otherwise
for all P ∈ ∆.
2.4 Remarks, Assumptions, and Continuity Concepts
In this section we discuss various technical aspects of the uncertainty averse
representation of preferences of Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a). In section
2.4.2 we clarify the relationship between the Savage (1972) framework con-
sidered in this dissertation and the generalized Anscombe and Aumann
(1963) framework originally considered by Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a).
In Section 2.4.2 we clearly state the assumptions on the uncertainty averse
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representation of preferences of Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a) which allow
to obtain the results presented in this dissertation. In Section 2.4.3 we dis-
cuss some continuity concepts which allow to characterize the situations in
which the uncertainty averse representation of preferences of Cerreia Vioglio
et al. (2011a) can be equivalently expressed in terms of countably additive
probabilities.
2.4.1 Remarks
The representations of preferences of Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a), Strza-
lecki (2011), Maccheroni et al. (2006) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
were originally obtained in a generalized Anscombe and Aumann (1963)
framework in which the objects of choice are uncertain acts. An uncertain
act is a Σ-measurable simple6 function f on S taking values in a convex
subset C of a vector space. C could be specified, for instance, as the set of
all probability measures µ on (R,B(R)) with finite support, where B(R) is
the Borel σ-algebra on R. A probability measure µ on (R,B(R)) has finite
support if the smallest closed set B ∈ B(R) such that µ(Bc) = 0 is finite.
Let F := F(C) be the set of all uncertain acts. Let u˜ : C → R be
a non-constant affine function. Let u˜(C) := {u˜(c), c ∈ C} ⊆ R. Let
B0(Σ, u˜(C)) := B0(S,Σ; u˜(C)) be the set of all real-valued Σ-measurable
simple functions on S with values in u˜(C) ⊆ R. Observe that, if f ∈ F , then
u˜(f) ∈ B0(Σ, u˜(C)). Let G˜ : u˜(C)×∆→ (−∞,+∞] be such that G˜(., P ) is
increasing on u˜(C) ⊆ R for each P ∈ ∆, lower semi-continuous and quasi-
convex on u˜(C)×∆, normalized, that is such that infP∈∆ G˜(y, P ) = y for all
y ∈ u˜(C), and such that G˜(., P ) is extended-valued continuous on u˜(C) ⊆ R
for each P ∈ ∆. An uncertainty averse representation of preferences (Cer-
6A function is said to be simple if it takes on only finitely many values.
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reia Vioglio et al. (2011a, Theorem 3)) is a function V u˜,G˜ : F → R defined
by,
V u˜,G˜(f) := inf
P∈∆
G˜(EP [u˜(f)], P ) (2.9)
for all f ∈ F . As in Section 2.3, the function G˜ : u˜(C) ×∆ → (−∞,+∞]
in Equation (2.9) is an uncertainty index describing the decision-maker’s
attitudes toward uncertainty. Differently from Section 2.3, the function
u˜ : C → R in Equation (2.9) is not a utility function7 but a utility index
describing the decision-maker’s attitudes toward risk. If C is specified, for
instance, as the set of all probability measures µ on (R,B(R)) with finite
support, then the utility index u˜ : C → R in Equation (2.9) is related to the
utility function u : R→ R in Equation (2.2) by the following relationship,
u˜(f(s)) =
∫
R
u(x)d f(s, x)
for all s ∈ S. Although the uncertainty averse representation of preferences
was defined and characterized by Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a) on the set
F of all Σ-measurable simple function f on S with values in C, it admits
a continuous extension V u˜
′
,G˜
′
: Fb → R to the set Fb := Fb(C) of all
bounded Σ-measurable functions fb on S with values in C (see Ghirardato
and Siniscalchi (2009)). As a result of this extension, C can be specified
as the set Mb := Mb(R,B(R)) of all probability measures µ on (R,B(R))
with bounded support. A probability measure µ on (R,B(R)) has bounded
support if µ([−b, b]) = 1 for some b ≥ 0. Denote by X˜ := Fb(Mb) the set of
7As indicated in Section 2.2.1 in this dissertation a utility function is intended as a
utility function for money u : R → R. Thus, in this dissertation a utility function is not,
in general, an affine function.
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all bounded Σ-measurable functions X˜ := fb on S with values inMb. Then,
u˜′(X˜(s)) =
∫
R
u(x)d X˜(s, x) (2.10)
for all s ∈ S. Let X ∈ X and let δX ∈ X˜ be such that δX(s)(.) is a Dirac
measure on B(R) for each s ∈ S, that is,
δX(s)(B) =

1 if X(s) ∈ B
0 otherwise
for all B ∈ B(R). Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004, Section 2.5) observed that the
mapping,
X ∈ X 7→ δX ∈ X˜
is an embedding. It follows that the space X of all bounded, real-valued, Σ-
measurable functions on S can be identified with the set of all the elements
of X˜ which are Dirac measures on B(R) for each s ∈ S. Let Uu,G′ : X → R
be the function defined by,
Uu,G
′
(X) := V u˜
′
,G˜
′
(δX) (2.11)
for all X ∈ X . Thus, by Equation (2.11), Equation (2.9), and Equation
(2.10),
Uu,G
′
(X) = inf
P∈∆
G′(EP [u˜′(δX)], P )
= inf
P∈∆
G′(EP
[ ∫
R
u(x)d δX(x)
]
, P )
= inf
P∈∆
G′(EP [u(X)], P )
as in Equation (2.2).
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2.4.2 Assumptions
Throughout this dissertation we will implicitly assume that the utility func-
tion u : R→ R is strictly increasing and concave and that the monotonicity
of the uncertainty index G : R × ∆ → (−∞,+∞] in its first argument is
strict.
The assumption that the utility function u is increasing ensures that the pref-
erences that the decision-maker expresses through the indifference prices are
consistent with the compelling principle of rationality (see Cerreia Vioglio
et al. (2010)). The assumption that the utility function u is concave ensures
that the preferences that the decision-maker expresses through the indiffer-
ence prices are consistent with the fundamental principle that diversification
does not increase “risk” (see Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2010)).
The assumptions that the utility function u and the uncertainty index G
are strictly increasing guarantee that the indifference prices are uniquely
defined.
Assumption 2.1. The utility function u : R→ R is strictly increasing and
concave.
Assumption 2.2. The uncertainty index G : R×∆→ (−∞,+∞] is strictly
increasing in its first argument.
Observe that, as u is concave and finite on all of R, it is necessarily continu-
ous (see Rockafellar (1970, Corollary 10.1.1)) and that the continuity of the
utility function u, combined with the different continuity properties of the
uncertainty index G, guarantees that the indifference prices exist.
Overall, Assumption 2.1 and Assumption 2.2 ensure that the uncertainty
averse representation of preferences Uu,G : X → R in Equation (2.2) is
strictly increasing, quasiconcave, and continuous with respect to the sup-
32
norm ||.||∞.
2.4.3 Continuity Concepts
The theories of decision under uncertainty discussed in Section 2.3 describe a
decision-maker’s subjective probabilities, priors, or beliefs in terms of finitely
additive probabilities. The conditions of positivity, normalization, and fi-
nite additivity are in fact sufficient for a set function to be interpretable as
an individual’s “coherent” judgment of probabilities (de Finetti, Chapter 3
(1970)). An individual’s judgment of probabilities is said to be “coherent”,
acceptable, or admissible if it is not intrinsically contradictory (de Finetti,
Chapter 3 (1970)).
Although from the decision-theoretic perspective the condition of count-
able additivity is objectionable (see Ramsey (1931), de Finetti (1964), and
Savage (1972)), from the mathematical perspective it is a convenient simpli-
fication. The axiom with which an individual’s choices must be consistent
for her preferences to be represented in terms of countably additive proba-
bilities is the axiom of monotone continuity (Arrow (1970)). The axiom of
monotone continuity was introduced by Arrow (1970) in the framework of
Savage’s (1972) expected utility and was employed, among others, by Cer-
reia Vioglio et al. (2011a), Maccheroni et al. (2006) and Chateauneuf et al.
(2005) to express, respectively, the uncertainty averse (Cerreia Vioglio et al.
(2011a)), the variational (Maccheroni et al. (2006)), and the multiple priors
(Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)) representations of preferences in terms of
countably additive probabilities. An equivalent technical condition, known
as continuity from below, is employed in the financial mathematics literature
to describe the situation in which a quasiconvex (see Cerreia Vioglio et al.
(2010)) or convex (see, for instance, Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004, Chapter 4))
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risk measure admits a dual representation on probability measures.
For simplicity in this dissertation we will assume, however, the stronger
condition of continuity with respect to bounded point-wise convergence, also
known as the Lebesgue property (see Jouini et al. (2006)).
Definition 2.1. An uncertainty averse representation of preferences Uu,G :
X → R is said to be continuous with respect to bounded point-wise conver-
gence if Uu,G(Xn) → Uu,G(X) whenever (Xn)n∈N is a uniformly bounded
sequence8 in X such that Xn(s)→ X(s) for every s ∈ S.
Proposition 2.1 shows that the uncertainty averse representation of prefer-
ences Uu,G : X → R in Equation (2.2) is continuous with respect to bounded
point-wise convergence if and only if the set of finitely additive probabili-
ties ∆ ⊂ X ∗ in Equation (2.2) can be equivalently replaced by its subset of
countably additive elements ∆σ ⊂ X ∗σ as the elements of ∆ ⊂ X ∗ which are
not countably additive do not contribute to the formation of the minimum
in Equation (2.2). In what follows the set of all elements of ∆ ⊂ X ∗ which
do not belong to ∆σ ⊂ X ∗σ is denoted by,
∆ \∆σ = {P ∈ X ∗ : P ∈ ∆ and P /∈ ∆σ}
The proof of Proposition 2.1 is an immediate application of Proposition 4.3
and Proposition 4.5 in Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2010).
Proposition 2.1. An uncertainty averse representation of preferences Uu,G :
X → R is continuous with respect to bounded point-wise convergence if and
only if,
G(x, P ) = +∞
for all (x, P ) ∈ R× (∆ \∆σ).
8That is, there exists M ∈ R such that ||Xn||∞ ≤M for all n ∈ N.
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Proof of Proposition 2.1. Observe that Equation (2.2) can be equivalently
written as,
Uu,G(X) = −ρR(u(X)) ∀X ∈ X
where ρR : X → R is a quasiconvex risk measure which is continuous with
respect to the sup-norm ||.||∞ and which is represented by the maximal risk
function R : R×∆→ [−∞,+∞) given by,
R(x,Q) = −G(−x,Q)
for all (x,Q) ∈ R × ∆. Observe also that Uu,G : X → R is continuous
with respect to bounded point-wise convergence if and only if ρR : X →
R is continuous with respect to bounded point-wise convergence. Thus,
the statement follows directly from Proposition 4.3 and Proposition 4.5 in
Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2010).
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Chapter 3
Indifference Pricing with Uncertainty
Averse Preferences
3.1 Indifference Buyer’s Price
Consider an uncertainty averse decision-maker who is endowed with a con-
stant monetary payoff w0 ∈ R and an uncertain monetary payoff X ∈ X .
The uncertainty averse decision-maker contemplates a transaction which
allows her to transfer the uncertain component of her wealth X ∈ X in
exchange for paying a constant amount of money m ∈ R. Accepting the
agreement would make her wealth constant and equal to w0 −m ∈ R. The
uncertainty averse decision-maker is therefore in the position of a buyer
of a policy (or insured) and the maximum price (or insurance premium)
m ∈ R which, from the perspective of her uncertainty averse preferences
Uu,G : X → R, makes the the constant monetary payoff w0 − m ∈ R
more desirable than the uncertain monetary payoff w0 + X ∈ X , corre-
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sponds precisely to the price which makes them equally desirable. For this
reason, this maximum price is denominated indifference buyer’s price. In
Subsection 3.1.1 we introduce its definition, we derive its properties, and we
identify its acceptance family. In Subsection 3.1.2 we characterize its dual
representation on finitely additive probabilities and on countably additive
probabilities. In Subsection 3.1.3 we provide more explicit characterizations
of its dual representation on countably additive probabilities in terms of the
variational (Maccheroni et al. (2006)), the multiplier (Hansen and Sargent
(2001), Strzalecki (2011)), and the multiple priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989)) representations of preferences.
3.1.1 Definition, Properties, and Acceptance Family
3.1.1.1 Definition
The indifference buyer’s price, which in this dissertation is considered from
an actuarial perspective, is defined as a function piu,Gw0 : X → R yielding the
maximum price that a decision-maker with uncertainty averse preferences
Uu,G : X → R and with constant initial wealth w0 ∈ R would offer to avoid
an uncertain monetary prospect in X (e.g. to receive insurance).
Definition 3.1. A function piu,Gw0 : X → R is said to be an indifference
buyer’s price if it satisfies,
u(w0 − piu,Gw0 (X)) = Uu,G(w0 +X) (3.1)
for all X ∈ X and w0 ∈ R.
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3.1.1.2 Properties
Proposition 3.1 asserts that the indifference buyer’s price is monotone de-
creasing, quasiconvex, and normalized. As a consequence of these properties,
the indifference buyer’s price piu,Gw0 : X → R is a quasiconvex risk measure.
Quasiconvex risk measures were introduced in the financial mathematics
literature by Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2010). A quasiconvex risk measure is
a function representing the ordering of alternative monetary payoffs in X
based on their relative “risk”, where the term risk is “[...] used in a loose
way to refer to any sort of uncertainty viewed from the standpoint of the
unfavorable contingency” (Knight (1921)).
Proposition 3.1. The indifference buyer’s price piu,Gw0 : X → R satisfies the
following properties for all X,Y ∈ X and w0 ∈ R.
(i) Monotonicity: If X ≥ Y , then piu,Gw0 (X) ≤ piu,Gw0 (Y ).
(ii) Quasiconvexity: piu,Gw0 (λX + (1 − λ)Y ) ≤ max{piu,Gw0 (X), piu,Gw0 (Y )} for
all λ ∈ [0, 1].
(iii) Normalization: piu,Gw0 (m) = −m for all m ∈ R.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. (i) Let X,Y ∈ X . If X ≥ Y , then by Definition
3.1 and by the increasing monotonicity of Uu,G : X → R,
u(w0 − piu,Gw0 (X)) = Uu,G(w0 +X) ≥ Uu,G(w0 + Y ) = u(w0 − piu,Gw0 (Y ))
and the increasing monotonicity of u : R → R yields piu,Gw0 (X) ≤ piu,Gw0 (Y ).
Thus, piu,Gw0 : X → R is monotone decreasing.
(ii) If λ ∈ [0, 1], then by Definition 3.1, by the quasiconcavity of Uu,G : X →
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R and by the increasing monotonicity of u : R→ R,
u(w0 − piu,Gw0 (λX + (1− λ)Y ))
= Uu,G(w0 + λX + (1−λ)Y )
= Uu,G(λ(w0+X) + (1− λ)(w0 + Y ))
≥ min{Uu,G(w0 +X), Uu,G(w0 + Y )}
= min{u(w0 − piu,Gw0 (X)), u(w0 − piu,Gw0 (Y ))}
= u(w0 −max{piu,Gw0 (X), piu,Gw0 (Y )})
and the increasing monotonicity of u : R→ R yields,
piu,Gw0 (λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ max{piu,Gw0 (X), piu,Gw0 (Y )}
for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, piu,Gw0 : X → R is quasiconvex.
(iii) If m ∈ R, then by Definition 3.1,
u(w0 − piu,Gw0 (m)) = u(w0 +m)
and the strict monotonicity of u : R → R yields piu,Gw0 (m) = −m. Thus,
piu,Gw0 : X → R is normalized.
Decreasing monotonicity implies that the decision-maker is willing to offer
higher prices to avoid higher losses. Quasiconvexity implies that the maxi-
mum price that the decision-maker is willing to offer to avoid a portfolio of
uncertain monetary payoffs is lower than the highest of the prices that she
is inclined to offer to avoid its constituents. Normalization implies that the
maximum price that the decision-maker is willing to offer to avoid a certain
loss is exactly equal to its amount.
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3.1.1.3 Acceptance Family
The indifference buyer’s price piu,Gw0 : X → R can be equivalently studied in
terms of an appropriately defined acceptance family. Acceptance families
were introduced in the mathematical finance literature on quasiconvex risk
measures by Drapeau and Kupper (2010). An acceptance family is a col-
lection of acceptance sets. We define the acceptance set of an uncertainty
averse decision-maker Uu,G : X → R with constant initial wealth w0 ∈ R at
level m ∈ R as the subset Au,Gw0,m of X given by,
Au,Gw0,m := {X ∈ X |Uu,G(w0 +X) ≥ u(w0 −m)} (3.2)
The acceptance set Au,Gw0,m defined by Equation (3.2) is the set of uncertain
monetary payoffs in X that a an uncertainty averse decision-maker Uu,G :
X → R with constant initial wealth w0 ∈ R prefers to the constant monetary
payoff −m ∈ R. We call (Au,Gw0,m)m∈R the acceptance family of an uncertainty
averse decision-maker Uu,G : X → R with constant initial wealth w0 ∈ R.
Proposition 3.2 asserts that the acceptance family (Au,Gw0,m)m∈R is monotone,
convex, and normalized.
Proposition 3.2. The acceptance family (Au,Gw0,m)m∈R satisfies the following
properties for all X,Y ∈ X and m,n ∈ R.
(i) Monotonicity:
(a) If X ∈ Au,Gw0,m and Y ≥ X, then Y ∈ Au,Gw0,m.
(b) If m ≤ n, then Au,Gw0,m ⊆ Au,Gw0,n.
(ii) Convexity: If X,Y ∈ Au,Gw0,m, then λX + (1 − λ)Y ∈ Au,Gw0,m for all
λ ∈ [0, 1].
(iii) Normalization: inf{x ∈ R |x ∈ Au,Gw0,m} = −m.
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Proof. Let X,Y ∈ X and m,n ∈ R.
(i-a) Let X ∈ Au,Gw0,m and Y ≥ X. By the increasing monotonicity of Uu,G :
X → R,
Uu,G(w0 + Y ) ≥ Uu,G(w0 +X) ≥ u(w0 −m)
Thus, Y ∈ Au,Gw0,m.
(i-b) Let n ≥ m and X ∈ Au,Gw0,m. By the increasing monotonicity of u : R→
R,
Uu,G(w0 +X) ≥ u(w0 −m) ≥ u(w0 − n)
Thus, X ∈ Au,Gw0,n.
(ii) Let X,Y ∈ Au,Gw0,m. By the quasiconcavity of Uu,G : X → R,
Uu,G(w0 + λX + (1− λ)Y )
= Uu,G(λ(w0 +X)+(1− λ)(w0 + Y ))
≥ min{Uu,G(w0 +X), Uu,G(w0 + Y )}
≥ u(w0 −m)
for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, λX + (1− λ)Y ∈ Au,Gw0,m for all λ ∈ [0, 1].
(iii) By the increasing monotonicity of u : R→ R,
inf{x ∈ R |u(w0 + x) ≥ u(w0 −m)} = −m.
Observe that the acceptance set Au,Gw0,m ⊂ X corresponds to the set of all un-
certain monetary prospects for which an uncertainty averse decision-maker
Uu,G : X → R with constant initial wealth w0 ∈ R would agree to buy
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protection, or insurance, at a price less than m ∈ R, that is,
Au,Gw0,m = {X ∈ X |piu,Gw0 (X) ≤ m} (3.3)
for all m ∈ R. Observe also that the indifference buyer’s price piu,Gw0 : X → R
satisfies,
piu,Gw0 (X) = inf{m ∈ R |X ∈ Au,Gw0,m}
for all X ∈ X . It follows from Equation (3.3) that Proposition 3.1 could be
equivalently obtained combining Proposition 3.2 with Theorem 1.7 in Dra-
peau and Kupper (2010). It also follows from Equation (3.3) that the indif-
ference buyer’s price inherits directly all the different continuity properties
of the uncertainty averse representation of preferences because piu,Gw0 : X → R
and Uu,G : X → R have the same level sets.
Let Au,G Cw0,m be the subset of X given by,
Au,G Cw0,m := {X ∈ X |Uu,G(w0 +X) < u(w0 −m)} (3.4)
for every m ∈ R. Remark 3.1, when combined with Equation (3.3), asserts
that the indifference buyer’s price piu,Gw0 : X → R inherits the continuity of
the uncertainty averse representation of preferences Uu,G : X → R with
respect to the sup-norm ||.||∞.
Remark 3.1. The sets Au,Gw0,m ⊂ X and Au,G
C
w0,m ⊂ X are closed with respect
to convergence in sup-norm ||.||∞ for all m ∈ R.
Remark 3.2, when combined with Equation (3.3), asserts that the indiffer-
ence buyer’s price piu,Gw0 : X → R inherits the continuity with respect to
bounded point-wise convergence of the uncertainty averse representation of
preferences Uu,G : X → R.
42
Remark 3.2. Uu,G : X → R is continuous with respect to bounded point-
wise convergence if and only if the sets Au,Gw0,m ⊂ X and Au,G
C
w0,m ⊂ X are
closed with respect to bounded point-wise convergence for all m ∈ R.
3.1.2 Dual Representation
3.1.2.1 Finitely Additive Probabilities
As a consequence of its monotonicity, quasiconvexity, and continuity with
respect to the sup-norm ||.||∞, the indifference buyer’s price piu,Gw0 : X → R
admits a representation in term of the set ∆ ⊂ X ∗ of all finitely additive
probabilities. The illustration of the representation results is considerably
simplified by introducing an appropriate notation for the support function1
of the acceptance set Au,Gw0,m ⊂ X which, consistently with the terminology
adopted in the mathematical finance literature, we designate as minimal
penalty function (see Drapeau and Kupper (2010) and Fo¨llmer and Schied
(2002, 2004)).
Definition 3.2. The minimal penalty function ru,Gw0 : R ×∆ → (−∞,+∞]
of the indifference buyer’s price piu,Gw0 : X → R is defined by,
ru,Gw0 (m,Q) := sup
X∈Au,Gw0,m
EQ[−X] (3.5)
for all (m,Q) ∈ R×∆.
The representation of the indifference buyer’s price piu,Gw0 in Proposition 3.3
is an application of the duality for quasiconcave functions introduced by
de Finetti (1949), extended by Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011b) and further
developed by Drapeau and Kupper (2010).
1For support functions see §13 in Rockafellar (1970).
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Proposition 3.3. The indifference buyer’s price piu,Gw0 : X → R has the
following representation,
piu,Gw0 (X) = sup
Q∈∆
R(EQ[−X], Q) (3.6)
for all X ∈ X . The maximal risk function Ru,Gw0 : R ×∆ → [−∞,+∞) for
which the representation in Equation (3.6) holds is unique and defined by,
Ru,Gw0 (x,Q) := inf{m ∈ R | ru,Gw0 (m,Q) ≥ x} (3.7)
for all (x,Q) ∈ R×∆. In particular, if R : R×∆→ [−∞,+∞) is any other
function satisfying the representation in Equation (3.6), then R(x,Q) ≤
Ru,Gw0 (x,Q) for all (x,Q) ∈ R×∆.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. By Proposition 3.1 and Remark 3.1 piu,Gw0 : X → R
is monotone decreasing, quasiconvex, and continuous with respect to the
sup-norm ||.||∞. By Theorem 4 in Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011b) a monotone
decreasing and quasiconvex function piu,Gw0 : X → R which is continuous with
respect to the sup-norm ||.||∞ has the following representation,
piu,Gw0 (X) = sup
Q∈∆
Ru,Gw0 (EQ[−X], Q)
for all X ∈ X , where Ru,Gw0 : R×∆→ [−∞,+∞) is defined by,
Ru,Gw0 (x,Q) := inf
X∈X :EQ[−X]≥x
piu,Gw0 (X)
for all (x,Q) ∈ R×∆, and can be rewritten as,
Ru,Gw0 (x,Q) = inf{piu,Gw0 (X) ∈ R |X ∈ X : EQ[−X] ≥ x}
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= inf{m ∈ R | ∃X ∈ X : piu,Gw0 (X) ≤ m, EQ[−X] ≥ x}
= inf{m ∈R | sup
X∈X :piu,Gw0 (X)≤m
EQ[−X] ≥ x}
= inf{m ∈ R | ru,Gw0 (m,Q) ≥ x}
for all (x,Q) ∈ R ×∆. By Corollary 2 in Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011b), if
R : R×∆→ [−∞,+∞) is increasing in the first component, quasiconcave,
upper semi-continuous, and such that R(., Q) is extended-valued continuous
on R for each Q ∈ ∆, then the function piu,Gw0 : X → R defined by,
piu,Gw0 (X) := sup
Q∈∆
R(EQ[−X], Q)
for all X ∈ X , is monotone decreasing, quasiconvex and continuous with
respect to the sup-norm ||.||∞. Moreover, for all (x¯, Q¯) ∈ R×∆ and X ∈ X
such that EQ¯[−X] ≥ x¯,
piu,Gw0 (X) = sup
Q∈∆
R(EQ[−X], Q) ≥ R(EQ¯[−X], Q¯) ≥ R(x¯, Q¯)
Thus2,
Ru,Gw0 (x¯, Q¯) = inf
X∈X :EQ¯[−X]≥x¯
piu,Gw0 (X) ≥ R(x¯, Q¯)
for all (x¯, Q¯) ∈ R×∆.
The representation in Equation (3.6) implies that an uncertainty averse
decision-maker evaluates the maximum price that she would pay to avoid an
uncertain monetary payoff in X as if, by the function Ru,Gw0 , she appraised
its expected loss under each probabilistic scenario in ∆, the appraisal Ru,Gw0
depending on her risk attitudes u, on her uncertainty attitudes G and on
her initial wealth w0 ∈ R and as if, by the function piu,Gw0 , she summarized
2See also Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a, Lemma 51)
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her appraisal by considering exclusively the worst probabilistic scenario in
∆.
3.1.2.2 Countably Additive Probabilities
Proposition 3.4 shows that an uncertainty averse representation of prefer-
ences Uu,G : X → R is continuous with respect to bounded point-wise con-
vergence if and only if the set of all finitely additive probabilities ∆ ⊂ X ∗
in Equation (3.6) can be equivalently replaced by its subset of countably
additive elements ∆σ ⊂ X ∗σ .
Proposition 3.4 is a direct consequence of Remark 3.2 and of Proposition
4.3 and Proposition 4.5 in Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2010).
Proposition 3.4. An uncertainty averse representation of preferences Uu,G :
X → R is continuous with respect to bounded point-wise convergence if and
only if,
R(x,Q) = −∞
for all (x,Q) ∈ R× (∆ \∆σ).
3.1.3 Examples
In this subsection we characterize the dual representations on countably
additive probabilities of the indifference buyer’s price defined in terms of the
variational (Maccheroni et al. (2006)), the multiplier (Hansen and Sargent
(2001), Strzalecki (2011)), and the multiple priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989)) representations of preferences. In what follows u∗ : R → R denotes
the convex conjugate of the strictly increasing and concave utility function
u : R→ R, that is,
u∗(λ) := sup
x∈R
(u(x)− λx) (3.8)
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for all λ ∈ R. All the examples presented in this subsection are direct
applications of various representation results collected in the Appendix at
the end of this chapter.
Example 3.1. The indifference buyer’s price piu,cw0 : X → R defined by a
variational representation of preferences Uu,c : X → R which is continuous
with respect to bounded point-wise convergence has the representation in
Proposition 3.3 with,
Ru,cw0 (x,Q) = w0−u−1
(
inf
λ∈(0,+∞)
{
λ(w0−x)+ inf
P∈∆σ
(
c(P)+EP
[
u∗
(
λ
dQ
dP
)])})
(3.9)
for all (x,Q) ∈ R × ∆σ. Equation (3.9) follows directly from Proposition
3.13 and Theorem 3.1 in the Appendix.
Example 3.2. The indifference buyer’s price piu,θ,R,P
?
w0 : X → R defined
by a multiplier representation of preferences Uu,θ,R,P? : X → R has the
representation in Proposition 3.3 with,
Ru,θ,R,P
?
w0 (x,Q) =
w0 − u−1
(
inf
λ∈(0,+∞)
{
λ(w0 − x) + inf
P∈∆σ(P?)
(
θR(P||P?) + EP
[
u∗
(
λ
dQ
dP
)])})
(3.10)
for all (x,Q) ∈ R × ∆σ with θ ∈ (0,+∞] and P? ∈ ∆σ. Equation (3.10)
follows directly from Proposition 3.13 and Corollary 3.1 in the Appendix.
Example 3.3. The indifference buyer’s price piu,Pw0 : X → R defined by a
multiple priors representation of preferences Uu,P : X → R which is contin-
uous with respect to bounded point-wise convergence has the representation
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in Proposition 3.3 with,
Ru,Pw0 (x,Q) = w0−u−1
(
inf
λ∈(0,+∞)
{
λ(w0−x)+ inf
P∈P
EP
[
u∗
(
λ
dQ
dP
)]})
(3.11)
for all (x,Q) ∈ R×∆σ with P ⊂ ∆σ. Equation (3.11) follows directly from
Proposition 3.13 and Corollary 3.2 in the Appendix.
3.2 Indifference Seller’s Price
Consider an uncertainty averse decision-maker who is endowed with a con-
stant monetary payoff w0 ∈ R. The uncertainty averse decision-maker is
offered a constant amount of money m ∈ R in exchange for accepting an
uncertain monetary payoff X ∈ X . Agreeing to the transaction would make
her wealth uncertain and equal to w0 + X + m ∈ X . The uncertainty
averse decision-maker is therefore in the position of a seller of a contract
(or insurer) and the minimum price (or insurance premium) m ∈ R which,
from the perspective of her uncertainty averse preferences Uu,G : X → R,
makes the uncertain monetary payoff w0 +X +m ∈ X more desirable than
the constant monetary payoff w0 ∈ R, corresponds precisely to the price
which makes them equally desirable. For this reason, this minimum price
is denominated indifference seller’s price. In Subsection 3.2.1 we introduce
its definition, we derive its properties, and we identify its acceptance set.
In Subsection 3.2.2 we characterize its dual representation on finitely ad-
ditive probabilities and on countably additive probabilities. In Subsection
3.2.3 we provide more explicit characterizations of its dual representation
on countably additive probabilities in terms of the variational (Maccheroni
et al. (2006)), the multiplier (Hansen and Sargent (2001), Strzalecki (2011)),
and the multiple priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)) representations of
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preferences.
3.2.1 Definition, Properties, and Acceptance Set
3.2.1.1 Definition
The indifference seller’s price, which in this dissertation is considered from an
actuarial perspective, is defined as the minimum price that a decision-maker
with uncertainty averse preferences Uu,G : X → R and with constant initial
wealth w0 ∈ R would demand to accept an uncertain monetary prospect in
X (e.g. to provide insurance).
Definition 3.3. A function ϕu,Gw0 : X → R is said to be an indifference
seller’s price if it satisfies,
u(w0) = U
u,G(w0 +X + ϕ
u,G
w0 (X)) (3.12)
for all X ∈ X and w0 ∈ R.
3.2.1.2 Properties
Proposition 3.5 asserts that the indifference seller’s price is monotone de-
creasing, convex, cash-additive, and normalized. As a result of these prop-
erties, the indifference seller’s price ϕu,Gw0 : X → R is a cash-additive convex
risk measure. Cash-additive convex risk measures were introduced by Deprez
and Gerber (1985) in the actuarial mathematics literature and by Frittelli
and Rosazza Gianin (2002) and Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002) in the financial
mathematics literature. A cash-additive convex risk measure is a function
yielding the minimum constant amount of money m ∈ R that must be added
to an uncertain monetary payoff in X ∈ X such that the adjusted uncertain
49
position X +m ∈ X becomes acceptable3 to a decision-maker.
Proposition 3.5. The indifference seller’s price ϕu,Gw0 : X → R satisfies the
following properties for all X,Y ∈ X .
(i) Monotonicity: If X ≥ Y , then ϕu,Gw0 (X) ≤ ϕu,Gw0 (Y ).
(ii) Convexity: ϕu,Gw0 (λX + (1−λ)Y ) ≤ λϕu,Gw0 (X) + (1−λ)ϕu,Gw0 (Y ) for all
λ ∈ [0, 1].
(iii) Cash-additivity: ϕu,Gw0 (X +m) = ϕ
u,G
w0 (X)−m for all m ∈ R.
(iv) Normalization: ϕu,Gw0 (0) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. (i) Let X,Y ∈ X . If X ≥ Y , then by Definition
3.3 and by the increasing monotonicity of Uu,G : X → R,
u(w0) = U
u,G(w0+Y + ϕ
u,G
w0 (Y ))
= Uu,G(w0 +X + ϕ
u,G
w0 (X))
≥ Uu,G(w0 + Y + ϕu,Gw0 (X))
and the increasing monotonicity of Uu,G : X → R yields ϕu,Gw0 (X) ≤ ϕu,Gw0 (Y ).
Thus, ϕu,Gw0 : X → R is monotone decreasing.
(ii) If m ∈ R, then by Definition 3.3,
u(w0) = U
u,G(w0+X + ϕ
u,G
w0 (X))
= Uu,G(w0 +X +m+ ϕ
u,G
w0 (X +m))
= u(w0)
3The criterion of acceptability is subjectively determined by the decision-maker de-
pending on the situation and on the problem under consideration.
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and the strict monotonicity of Uu,G : X → R yields,
ϕu,Gw0 (X) = m+ ϕ
u,G
w0 (X +m)
Thus, ϕu,Gw0 : X → R is cash-additive.
(iii) If λ ∈ [0, 1], then by the quasiconcavity of Uu,G : X → R and by
Definition 3.3,
Uu,G(w0 + λX + (1− λ)Y + λϕu,Gw0 (X) + (1− λ)ϕu,Gw0 (Y ))
= Uu,G(λ(w0 +X + ϕ
u,G
w0 (X)) + (1− λ)(w0 + Y + ϕu,Gw0 (Y )))
≥ min{Uu,G(w0 +X + ϕu,Gw0 (X)), Uu,G(w0 + Y + ϕu,Gw0 (Y ))}
=Uu,G(w0 + λX + (1− λ)Y + ϕu,Gw0 (λX + (1− λ)Y ))
= u(w0)
and the increasing monotonicity of Uu,G : X → R yields,
ϕu,Gw0 (λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ λϕu,Gw0 (X) + (1− λ)ϕu,Gw0 (Y )
Thus, ϕu,Gw0 : X → R is convex.
(iv) As u : R→ R is strictly increasing,
u(w0 + ϕ
u,G
w0 (0)) = u(w0)
if and only if ϕu,Gw0 (0) = 0. Thus, ϕ
u,G
w0 : X → R is normalized.
Decreasing monotonicity implies that a decision-maker would demand higher
prices to accept higher losses. Convexity implies that the minimum price
that a decision-maker would demand to accept of a portfolio of uncertain
monetary payoffs is lower than the convex combinations of the prices that
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she would demand to accept its constituents. Cash-additivity implies that
adding a constant amount of money to an uncertain monetary payoff de-
creases the minimum price that a decision-maker would demand to accept
the uncertain prospect exactly by this constant amount. Normalization im-
plies that a decision-maker would not pay any money to receive a monetary
payoff which is certainly equal to zero4.
3.2.1.3 Acceptance Set
The indifference seller’s price piu,Gw0 : X → R can be equivalently studied in
terms of the acceptance set Au,Gw0,0 ⊂ X of an uncertainty averse decision-
maker Uu,G : X → R with constant initial wealth w0 ∈ R at level zero. This
is the subset Au,Gw0,0 of X given by,
Au,Gw0,0 = {X ∈ X |Uu,G(w0 +X) ≥ u(w0)} (3.13)
and it corresponds to the set of uncertain monetary payoffs in X that a
decision-maker with uncertainty averse preferences Uu,G : X → R and with
constant initial wealth w0 ∈ R finds more desirable than nothing.
Proposition 3.6 asserts that the acceptance set Au,Gw0,0 ⊂ X is monotone, con-
vex, and normalized. Proposition 3.6 is a direct consequence of Proposition
3.2 in Subsection 3.2.1.3 and its proof is not provided.
Proposition 3.6. The acceptance set Au,Gw0,0 ⊂ X satisfies the following
properties for all X,Y ∈ X .
(i) Monotonicity: If X ∈ Au,Gw0,0 and Y ≥ X, then Y ∈ A
u,G
w0,0
.
(ii) Convexity: If X,Y ∈ Au,Gw0,0, then λX + (1 − λ)Y ∈ A
u,G
w0,0
for all
λ ∈ [0, 1].
4In other words, a decision-maker would demand a non-negative price to accept a
monetary payoff which is certainly equal to zero.
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(iii) Normalization: inf{x ∈ R |x ∈ Au,Gw0,0} = 0.
Remark 3.3 clarifies the relationship between the acceptance set Au,Gw0,m ⊂ X
at level m ∈ R and the acceptance set Au,Gw0,0 at level zero of an uncertainty
averse decision-maker Uu,G : X → R with constant initial wealth w0 ∈ R.
Remark 3.3. The acceptance setAu,Gw0,m ⊂ X satisfiesAu,Gw0,m = Au,Gw0−m,0+m
for all m ∈ R.
Observe that the acceptance set Au,Gw0,0 ⊂ X corresponds to the set of all un-
certain monetary prospects for which an uncertainty averse decision-maker
Uu,G : X → R with constant initial wealth w0 ∈ R would agree to sell
protection, or insurance, in exchange of nothing, that is,
Au,Gw0,0 = {X ∈ X |ϕu,Gw0 (X) ≤ 0} (3.14)
Observe also that the indifference seller’s price ϕu,Gw0 : X → R satisfies,
ϕu,Gw0 (X) = inf{m ∈ R |X +m ∈ Au,Gw0,0}
for all X ∈ X . It follows from Equation (3.14) that Proposition 3.1 could
be equivalently obtained combining Proposition 3.6 with Proposition 4.7
in Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004). It also follows from Equation (3.14) that
the indifference seller’s price inherits directly all the different continuity
properties of the uncertainty averse representation of preferences because
ϕu,Gw0 : X → R and Uu,G : X → R have the same level sets.
Let Au,G Cw0,0 be the subset of X given by,
Au,G Cw0,0 := {X ∈ X |Uu,G(w0 +X) < u(w0)} (3.15)
Remark 3.4, when combined with Equation (3.14), asserts that the indiffer-
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ence seller’s price ϕu,Gw0 : X → R inherits the continuity of the uncertainty
averse representation of preferences Uu,G : X → R with respect to the sup-
norm ||.||∞.
Remark 3.4. The sets Au,Gw0,0 ⊂ X and A
u,G C
w0,0
⊂ X are closed with respect
to convergence in sup-norm ||.||∞.
Remark 3.5, when combined with Equation (3.14), asserts that the indif-
ference seller’s price ϕu,Gw0 : X → R inherits the continuity with respect to
bounded point-wise convergence of the uncertainty averse representation of
preferences Uu,G : X → R.
Remark 3.5. Uu,G : X → R is continuous with respect to bounded point-
wise convergence if and only if the sets Au,Gw0,0 ⊂ X and A
u,G C
w0,0
⊂ X are
closed with respect to bounded point-wise convergence.
Observe that, as a result of decreasing monotonicity and cash-additivity, the
indifference seller’s price φu,Gw0 : X → R is even Lipschitz continuous with
respect to the supremum norm ||.||∞ (see Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004, Lemma
4.3)).
3.2.2 Dual Representation
3.2.2.1 Finitely Additive Probabilities
As a consequence of its monotonicity, convexity, and cash-additivity, the in-
difference seller’s price ϕu,Gw0 : X → R admits a representation in terms of the
set ∆ ⊂ X ∗ of all finitely additive probabilities. The following proposition
is a direct application of Proposition 3.5 and of Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004,
Theorem 4.15).
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Proposition 3.7. The indifference seller’s price ϕu,Gw0 : X → R has the
following representation,
ϕu,Gw0 (X) = sup
Q∈∆
(
EQ[−X]− α(Q)
)
(3.16)
for all X ∈ X . The minimal penalty function αu,Gw0 : ∆ → (−∞,+∞] for
which the representation in Equation (3.16) holds is unique and defined by,
αu,Gw0 (Q) := sup
X∈Au,Gw0,0
EQ[−X] (3.17)
for all Q ∈ ∆. In particular, if α : ∆ → (−∞,+∞] is any other function
satisfying the representation in Equation (3.16), then αu,Gw0 (Q) ≤ α(Q) for
all Q ∈ ∆.
The representation in Equation (3.16) implies that an uncertainty averse
decision-maker evaluates the minimum price that she would demand to ac-
cept an uncertain monetary payoff in X as if, by the function αu,Gw0 , she
applied a correction to its expected loss under each probabilistic scenario in
∆, the correction αUw0 depending on her risk attitudes u, on her uncertainty
attitudes G and on her initial wealth w0 ∈ R and as if, by the function
ϕu,Gw0 , she summarized her appraisal by considering exclusively the worst
probabilistic scenario in ∆.
3.2.2.2 Countably Additive Probabilities
Proposition 3.4 shows that an uncertainty averse representation of prefer-
ences Uu,G : X → R is continuous with respect to bounded point-wise con-
vergence if and only if the set of all finitely additive probabilities ∆ ⊂ X ∗
in Equation (3.16) can be equivalently replaced by its subset of countably
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additive elements ∆σ ⊂ X ∗σ .
Proposition 3.8 is a direct consequence of Remark 3.5, of Proposition 4.5 in
Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2010), and of Proposition 3 in Kra¨tschmer (2005).
Proposition 3.8. An uncertainty averse representation of preferences Uu,G :
X → R is continuous with respect to bounded point-wise convergence if and
only if,
α(Q) = +∞
for all Q /∈ ∆σ.
3.2.3 Examples
In this subsection we derive the dual representations on countably addi-
tive probabilities of the indifference seller’s price defined in terms of the
variational (Maccheroni et al. (2006)), the multiplier (Hansen and Sargent
(2001), Strzalecki (2011)), and the multiple priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989)) representations of preferences. As in subsection 3.1.3, in what fol-
lows u∗ : R → R will denote the convex conjugate of the strictly increasing
and concave utility function u : R → R. All the examples presented in this
subsection are direct applications of various representation results collected
in the Appendix at the end of this chapter.
Example 3.4. The indifference seller’s price ϕu,cw0 : X → R defined by a
variational representation of preferences Uu,c : X → R which is continuous
with respect to bounded point-wise convergence has the representation in
Proposition 3.7 with,
αu,cw0 (Q) = w0 + inf
λ∈(0,+∞)
1
λ
{
inf
P∈∆σ
(
c(P) +EP
[
u∗
(
λ
dQ
dP
)])
− u(w0)
}
(3.18)
for all Q ∈ ∆σ. Equation (3.18) follows directly from Remark 3.6 and
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Theorem 3.1 in the Appendix.
Example 3.5. The indifference seller’s price ϕu,θ,R,P
?
w0 : X → R defined
by a multiplier representation of preferences Uu,θ,R,P? : X → R has the
representation in Proposition 3.7 with,
αu,θ,R,P
?
w0 (Q) =
w0 + inf
λ∈(0,+∞)
1
λ
{
inf
P∈∆σ(P?)
(
θR(P||P?) + EP
[
u∗
(
λ
dQ
dP
)])
− u(w0)
}
(3.19)
for all (x,Q) ∈ R × ∆σ with θ ∈ (0,+∞] and P? ∈ ∆σ. Equation (3.19)
follows directly from Remark 3.6 and Corollary 3.1 in the Appendix.
Example 3.6. The indifference seller’s price ϕu,Pw0 : X → R defined by a
multiple priors representation of preferences Uu,P : X → R which is contin-
uous with respect to bounded point-wise convergence has the representation
in Proposition 3.7 with,
αu,Pw0 (Q) = w0 + inf
λ∈(0,+∞)
1
λ
{
inf
P∈P
EP
[
u∗
(
λ
dQ
dP
)]
− u(w0)
}
(3.20)
for all (x,Q) ∈ R×∆σ with P ⊂ ∆σ. Equation (3.20) follows directly from
Remark 3.6 and Corollary 3.1 in the Appendix.
3.3 Appendix
The dual representations of the indifference buyer’s price and of the indiffer-
ence seller’s price defined by the variational, the multiplier, and the multiple
priors representations of preferences presented in Subsection 3.1.3 and Sub-
section 3.2.3 are special cases of the dual representations of the indifference
buyer’s price and of the indifference seller’s price defined by a general strictly
increasing, concave, and continuous function. In Subsection 3.3.1 of this Ap-
57
pendix we describe the dual representation of a general strictly increasing,
concave, and continuous function while in Subsection 3.3.2 of this Appendix
we characterize the maximal risk function and the minimal penalty function
representing the indifference buyer’s price and the indifference seller’s price
defined by a general strictly increasing, concave, and continuous function.
3.3.1 Dual Representation of a Concave Preference Functional
In this section we describe the dual representation of a general strictly in-
creasing, concave, and continuous function U : X → R in terms of its convex
conjugate function U∗ : X ∗ → (−∞,+∞] defined by,
U∗(µ) := sup
X∈X
(
U(X)− Eµ[X]
)
(3.21)
for all µ ∈ X ∗.
Proposition 3.9. A strictly increasing, concave, and continuous function
U : X → R has the following representation,
U(X) = inf
Q∈∆
inf
λ∈(0,+∞)
(
EQ[λX] + U
∗(λQ)
)
(3.22)
for all X ∈ X .
Proof. By Proposition 3.3 a monotone increasing, quasiconcave, and contin-
uous function U : X → R has the following representation,
U(X) = inf
Q∈∆
V (EQ[X], Q) (3.23)
for all X ∈ X . The minimal value function V ? : R × ∆ → (−∞,+∞] for
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which the representation in Equation (3.23) holds is unique and defined by,
V ?(x,Q) := sup
X∈X :EQ[X]≤x
U(X)
for all (x,Q) ∈ R×∆. In particular, if V : R×∆→ (−∞,+∞] is any other
function satisfying the representation in Equation (3.23), then V (x,Q) ≥
V ?(x,Q) for all (x,Q) ∈ R×∆. The minimal value function V ? : R×∆→
(−∞,+∞] can be rewritten as,
V ?(x,Q) = sup{U(X) ∈R |X ∈ X : EQ[−X] ≥ −x}
= sup{m ∈ R | ∃X ∈ X : U(X) ≥ m, EQ[−X] ≥ −x}
= sup{m ∈ R | supX∈X :U(X)≥mEQ[−X] ≥ −x}
for all (x,Q) ∈ R × ∆. As U : X → R is concave5 and U∗(0) = +∞, by
Theorem 13.5 and Theorem 9.7 in Rockafellar (1970),
sup
X∈X :U(X)≥m
EQ[−X] = inf
λ∈(0,+∞)
1
λ
(
U∗(λQ)−m
)
(3.24)
for all (m,P ) ∈ R×∆. Thus,
V ?(x,Q) = sup
{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣ inf
λ∈(0,+∞)
1
λ
(
U∗(λQ)−m
)
≥ −x
}
= sup
{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣ inf
λ∈(0,+∞)
(
λx+ U∗(λQ) ≥ m
)}
= inf
λ∈(0,+∞)
(
λx+ U∗(λQ)
)
(3.25)
for all (x, P ) ∈ R×∆. See also Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011b, Example 3.2)
and Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a, Corollary 38).
5Observe that a concave function is quasiconcave, while a quasiconcave function is not
necessarily concave.
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Proposition 3.10 characterizes the situation in which the set of finitely ad-
ditive probabilities ∆ ⊂ X ∗ in Equation (3.22) can be equivalently replaced
by its subset of countably additive elements ∆σ ⊂ X ∗σ . Proposition 3.10 is
a direct consequence of Proposition 2.1.
Proposition 3.10. A strictly increasing, concave, and continuous function
U : X → R is continuous with respect to bounded point-wise convergence if
and only if,
U∗(λQ) = +∞
for all Q /∈ ∆σ and λ ∈ (0,+∞).
A classic example of strictly increasing, concave, and continuous function U :
X → R which is continuous with respect to bounded point-wise convergence
is the expected utility Uu,P : X → R defined in terms of a countably additive
probability P ∈ ∆σ (see Equation (2.1)). Consistently with the assumptions
and with the notation employed throughout this dissertation, in what follows
u : R→ R denotes a strictly increasing and concave function, and u∗ : R→
R denotes its convex conjugate function (see Equation (3.8)).
Proposition 3.11. Let U : X → R be the function defined by,
U(X) = EP[u(X)] (3.26)
for all X ∈ X where P ∈ ∆σ. Then U : X → R has the representation in
Proposition 3.9 with,
U∗(λQ) =

EP
[
u∗
(
λ
dQ
dP
)]
if Q ∈ ∆σ(P)
+∞ otherwise
for all λ ∈ (0,+∞).
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Proof of Proposition 3.11. By Proposition 4.104 and Theorem 4.106 in Fo¨llmer
and Schied (2004),
sup
X∈X :EP[u(X)]≥m
EQ[−X] =

inf
λ∈(0,+∞)
1
λ
(
EP
[
u∗
(
λ
dQ
dP
)]
−m
)
if Q ∈ ∆σ(P)
+∞ otherwise
Thus, the statement follows from Theorem 13.5 and Theorem 9.7 in Rock-
afellar (1970) (see Equation (3.24)).
Theorem 3.1 describes the convex conjugate function of a variational repre-
sentation of preferences Uu,c : X → R which is continuous with respect to
bounded point-wise convergence. Recall that a variational representation of
preferences Uu,c : X → R is continuous with respect to bounded point-wise
convergence if and only if c(P ) = +∞ for all P /∈ ∆σ (see Proposition 2.1).
Theorem 3.1. Let U : X → R be the function defined by,
U(X) = inf
P∈∆σ
(
EP[u(X)] + c(P)
)
for all X ∈ X . Then U : X → R has the representation in Proposition 3.9
with,
U∗(λQ) =

inf
P∈∆σ
(
c(P) + EP
[
u∗
(
λ
dQ
dP
)])
if Q ∈ ∆σ
+∞ otherwise
for all λ ∈ (0,+∞).
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Observe that a variational representation of prefer-
ences U : X → R which is continuous with respect to bounded point-wise
convergence can be equivalently written as,
U(X) = −ρc(u(X)) ∀X ∈ X
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where ρc : X → R is a cash-additive convex risk measure represented by
the minimal penalty function c : ∆→ (−∞,+∞] such that c(P ) = +∞ for
all P /∈ ∆σ. Let λ ∈ (0,+∞) and Q ∈ ∆. By decreasing monotonicity of
ρc : X → R,
U∗(λQ) = sup
X∈X
(
EQ[−λX]− ρc(u(X))
)
= sup
(X,Z)∈X×X :u(X)≥Z
(
EQ[−λX]− ρc(Z)
)
= sup
(X,Z)∈X×X
(
EQ[−λX]− ρc(Z)− δ(X,Z | U)
)
where U ⊂ X × X is the convex set defined by,
U := {(X,Z) ∈ X × X : u(X) ≥ Z}
and δ(. | U) : X × X → [0,+∞] is the convex function defined by,
δ(X,Z | U) :=

0 if (X,Z) ∈ U
+∞ otherwise
Let g : X × X → R be the concave function defined by,
g(X,Z) := EQ[−λX]− ρc(Z)
for all (X,Z) ∈ X × X . Let f : X × X → [0,+∞] be the convex function
defined by,
f(X,Z) := δ(X,Z | U)
for all (X,Z) ∈ X × X . By Fenchel’s Duality Theorem (see Rockafellar
62
(1970, Theorem 31.1)),
sup
(X,Z)∈X×X
(
g(X,Z)− f(X,Z)
)
= inf
(P¯ ,Q¯)∈X ∗×X ∗
(
g∗(P¯ , Q¯) + f∗(P¯ , Q¯)
)
The function g∗ : X ∗ × X ∗ → (−∞,+∞] is the convex conjugate function
of g : X × X → R, that is,
g∗(P¯ , Q¯) = sup
(X,Z)∈X×X
(
g(X,Z)− EP¯ [X]− EQ¯[Z]
)
for all (P¯ , Q¯) ∈ X ∗ × X ∗. The function f∗ : X ∗ × X ∗ → (−∞,+∞] is the
convex conjugate function of f : X × X → [0,+∞], that is,
f∗(P¯ , Q¯) = sup
(X,Z)∈X×X
(
EP¯ [X] + EQ¯[Z]− f(X,Z)
)
for all (P¯ , Q¯) ∈ X ∗×X ∗. The function g∗ : X ∗×X ∗ → (−∞,+∞] satisfies,
g∗(P¯ , Q¯) = sup
(X,Z)∈X×X
(
EQ[−λX]− ρc(Z)− EP¯ [X]− EQ¯[Z]
)
= sup
Z∈X
(
EQ¯[−Z]− ρc(Z)
)
+ sup
X∈X
(
EQ[−λX]− EP¯ [X]
)
= c(Q¯) + δ(−P¯ |λQ)
where the function δ(. |λQ) : X ∗ → [0,+∞] is defined by,
δ(−P¯ |λQ) :=

0 if −P¯ = λQ
+∞ otherwise
for all P¯ ∈ X ∗. It follows that,
inf
(P¯ ,Q¯)∈X ∗×X ∗
(
g∗(P¯ , Q¯) + f∗(P¯ , Q¯)
)
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= inf
(P¯ ,Q¯)∈X ∗×X ∗
(
c(Q¯) + δ(−P¯ |λQ) + f∗(P¯ , Q¯)
)
= inf
Q¯∈X ∗
(
c(Q¯) + f∗(−λQ, Q¯)
)
= inf
Q¯∈∆σ
(
c(Q¯) + f∗(−λQ, Q¯)
)
where the last equality follows from the fact that c(Q¯) = +∞ for all Q¯ /∈ ∆σ.
The function f∗ : X ∗ ×X ∗ → (−∞,+∞] satisfies,
f∗(−λQ, Q¯) = sup
(X,Z)∈X×X
(
EQ[−λX] + EQ¯[Z]− δ(X,Z | U)
)
= sup
(X,Z)∈U
(
EQ¯[Z]− EQ[λX]
)
= sup
(X,Z)∈X×X :u(X)≥Z
(
EQ¯[Z]− EQ[λX]
)
= sup
X∈X
(
EQ¯[u(X)]− EQ[λX]
)
for all Q¯ ∈ ∆σ. Therefore, by Proposition 3.11,
f∗(−λQ, Q¯) =

EQ¯
[
u∗
(
λ
dQ
dQ¯
)]
if Q ∈ ∆σ(Q¯)
+∞ otherwise
for all Q¯ ∈ ∆σ. Thus,
inf
Q¯∈∆σ
(
c(Q¯)+f∗(−λQ, Q¯)
)
=

inf
Q¯∈∆σ
(
c(Q¯) + EQ¯
[
u∗
(
λ
dQ
dQ¯
)])
if Q ∈ ∆σ
+∞ otherwise
Corollary 3.1 describes the convex conjugate function of a multiplier repre-
sentation of preferences Uu,θ,R,P? : X → R. Observe that, since R(P ||P?) =
+∞ for all P /∈ ∆σ(P?), any multiplier representation of preferences Uu,θ,R,P? :
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X → R is continuous with respect to bounded point-wise convergence (see
Proposition 2.1).
Corollary 3.1. Let U : X → R be the function defined by,
U(X) = inf
P∈∆σ(P?)
(
EP[u(X)] + θR(P||P?)
)
for all X ∈ X with θ ∈ (0,+∞] and P? ∈ ∆σ. Then U : X → R has the
representation in Proposition 3.9 with,
U∗(λQ) =

inf
P∈∆σ(P?)
(
R(P||P?) + EP
[
u∗
(
λ
dQ
dP
)])
if Q ∈ ∆σ
+∞ otherwise
for all λ ∈ (0,+∞).
Proof of Corollary 3.1. Follows from Theorem 3.1 setting c(P) = θR(P||P?)
for all P ∈ ∆σ with θ ∈ (0,+∞] and P? ∈ ∆σ.
Corollary 3.2 describes the convex conjugate function of a multiple priors
representation of preferences Uu,P : X → R which is continuous with respect
to bounded point-wise convergence. Recall that a multiple priors represen-
tation of preferences Uu,P : X → R is continuous with respect to bounded
point-wise convergence if and only if P ⊂ ∆σ (Proposition 2.1).
Corollary 3.2. Let U : X → R be the function defined by,
U(X) = inf
P∈P
EP[u(X)]
for all X ∈ X with P ⊂ ∆σ. Then U : X → R has the representation in
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Proposition 3.9 with,
U∗(λQ) =

inf
P∈P
EP
[
u∗
(
λ
dQ
dP
)]
if Q ∈ ∆σ
+∞ otherwise
for all λ ∈ (0,+∞).
Proof of Corollary 3.2. Follows from Theorem 3.1 setting c(P) = 0 if P ∈ P
and c(P) = +∞ if P /∈ P for all P ∈ ∆σ and with P ⊂ ∆σ.
3.3.2 Dual Representation of the Indifference Buyer’s Price Defined by a
Concave Preference Functional
In this subsection we characterize the dual representation of the indifference
buyer’s price and of the indifference seller’s price defined in terms of a strictly
increasing, concave, and continuous function. As in Subsection 3.3.1, we
denote by U : X → R a strictly increasing, concave, and continuous function,
and by U∗ : X ∗ → (−∞,+∞] its convex conjugate function (see Equation
(3.21)). In addition, we denote by u : R → R the restriction of U : X → R
to the real line, that is,
u(x) := U(x)
for all x ∈ R. It follows that u : R→ R is a strictly increasing and concave
function.
Proposition 3.12 and Remark 3.6 characterize the minimal penalty functions
representing, respectively, the indifference buyer’s price and the indifference
seller’s price, defined by a strictly increasing, concave, and continuous func-
tion U : X → R.
Proposition 3.12. Let rUw0 : ∆ × R → (−∞,+∞] be the function defined
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by,
rUw0(m,Q) := sup
X∈X :U(w0+X)≥u(w0−m)
EQ[−X]
for all (m,Q) ∈ ∆× R. Then,
rUw0(m,Q) = w0 + inf
λ∈(0,+∞)
1
λ
(
U∗(λQ)− u(w0 −m)
)
for all (m,Q) ∈ R×∆.
Proof of Proposition 3.12. As U : X → R is concave and U∗(0) = +∞, by
Theorem 13.5 and Theorem 9.7 in Rockafellar (1970),
rUw0(m,Q) = inf
λ∈(0,+∞)
1
λ
(
sup
X∈X
(
U(w0 +X)− u(w0 −m)− EQ[λX]
))
= inf
λ∈(0,+∞)
1
λ
(
sup
X∈X
(
U(w0 +X)− EQ[λ(w0 +X)]
)
+ λw0 − u(w0 −m)
)
= w0 + inf
λ∈(0,+∞)
1
λ
(
U∗(λQ)− u(w0 −m)
)
for all (m,Q) ∈ R×∆.
Remark 3.6. Let αUw0 : ∆→ (−∞,+∞] be the function defined by,
αUw0(Q) := r
U
w0(0, Q)
for all Q ∈ ∆. Then,
αUw0(Q) = w0 + inf
λ∈(0,+∞)
1
λ
(
U∗(λQ)− u(w0)
)
for all Q ∈ ∆.
Proposition 3.13 characterizes the maximal risk function representing the
indifference buyer’s price defined by a strictly increasing, concave, and con-
tinuous function U : X → R.
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Proposition 3.13. Let RUw0 : ∆ × R → [−∞,+∞) be the function defined
by,
RUw0(x,Q) := inf{m ∈ R | rUw0(m,Q) ≥ x}
for all (x,Q) ∈ ∆× R. Then,
RUw0(x,Q) = w0 − u−1
(
inf
λ∈(0,+∞)
(
λ(w0 − x) + U∗(λQ)
))
for all (x,Q) ∈ R×∆.
Proof of Proposition 3.13. By Proposition 3.12,
RUw0(x,Q) = inf
{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣w0 + inf
λ∈(0,+∞)
1
λ
(
U∗(λQ)− u(w0 −m)
)
≥ x
}
= inf
{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣ inf
λ∈(0,+∞)
(
λ(w0 − x) + U∗(λQ)
)
≥ u(w0 −m)
}
= inf
{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣m ≥ w0 − u−1( inf
λ∈(0,+∞)
(
λ(w0 − x) + U∗(λQ)
))}
= w0 − u−1
(
inf
λ∈(0,+∞)
(
λ(w0 − x) + U∗(λQ)
))
for all (x,Q) ∈ R×∆.
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Chapter 4
Characterizations of Comparative
Uncertainty Attitudes
4.1 Comparative Uncertainty Aversion
In this section we study the comparison of the different extents of uncer-
tainty aversion of different decision-makers at a given level of constant initial
wealth. In Section 4.1.1 we present a definition of comparative uncertainty
aversion which is consistent with the definition of comparative uncertainty
aversion of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) and with the definition of com-
parative risk aversion of Yaari (1969). In Section 4.1.2 we provide various
characterizations of comparative uncertainty aversion in terms of the in-
difference buyer’s price and of the indifference seller’s price introduced in
Chapter 3.
Observe that, for simplicity, all the definitions and all the results are pro-
vided in terms of the more general notion of comparative risk and uncer-
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tainty aversion, and that all the definitions and all the results which charac-
terize comparative uncertainty aversion only will be recovered as particular
cases under a suitable normalization condition.
4.1.1 Definition
The notion of comparative risk and uncertainty aversion allows to compare
the different extents of risk and uncertainty aversion of different decision-
makers Uu1,G1 : X → R and Uu2,G2 : X → R endowed with the same
constant initial wealth w0 ∈ R. The intuition underlying the notion of
comparative risk and uncertainty aversion is that if a decision-maker Uu1,G1 :
X → R endowed with constant initial wealth w0 ∈ R prefers a constant
monetary payoff x ∈ R to a stochastic monetary payoff X ∈ X , then a more
risk and uncertainty averse decision-maker Uu2,G2 : X → R endowed with
the same constant initial wealth w0 ∈ R will do the same.
Definition 4.1. A decision-maker Uu1,G1 : X → R is said to be less risk
and uncertainty averse than another Uu2,G2 : X → R if,
u1(w0 + x) ≥ Uu1,G1(w0 +X) ⇒ u2(w0 + x) ≥ Uu2,G2(w0 +X) (4.1)
for all X ∈ X , x ∈ R, and w0 ∈ R.
Note that the second decision-maker Uu2,G2 may prefer the constant mon-
etary payoff x ∈ R either because she is more risk averse than the first
decision-maker Uu1,G1 , that is because she dislikes the variability of the
outcomes of the stochastic monetary payoff X ∈ X more than the first
decision-maker Uu1,G1 , or because she is more uncertainty averse than the
first decision-maker Uu1,G1 , that is because she dislikes the fact that the
probabilities of the different possible outcomes of X ∈ X are not objectively
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determined more than the first decision-maker Uu1,G1 . For this reason, Def-
inition 4.1 is, in general, a definition of comparative risk and uncertainty
aversion, and not a definition of comparative uncertainty aversion only.
For Definition 4.1 to specialize to comparative uncertainty aversion only, it
is necessary that both decision-makers Uu1,G1 and Uu2,G2 display the same
risk attitudes u1 and u2, that is that u1 = u2
1. This normalization condition
ensures, in fact, that different choices of the decision-makers are ascribable
only to their different uncertainty attitudes G1 and G2, and not also to their
different risk attitudes u1 and u2.
Remark 4.1. Definition 4.1 can be immediately characterized in terms of
the acceptance family (Au,Gw0,m)m∈R introduced in Section 3.1.1.3. In fact, it
follows directly from Definition 4.1 that a decision-maker Uu1,G1 : X → R is
less risk and uncertainty averse than another Uu2,G2 : X → R if and only if,
Au2,G2w0,m ⊆ Au1,G1w0,m (4.2)
for all m ∈ R and w0 ∈ R. Therefore, a more risk and uncertainty averse
decision-maker Uu2,G2 : X → R prefers fewer stochastic monetary payoffs
X ∈ X to a constant monetary payoff −m ∈ R at every level of constant
initial wealth w0 ∈ R.
Note that Uu1,G1 is said to be more risk and uncertainty averse than Uu2,G2
when the implication in Equation (4.1) holds true in the opposite direction
and that Uu1,G1 is said to be as risk and uncertainty averse as Uu2,G2 when
the implication in Equation (4.1) holds true in both directions. The same
considerations apply to the set inclusion in Remark 4.1.
1Actually, it is not necessary that u1 and u2 are identical, as it is sufficient that u1 and
u2 are equivalent, that is that either u1 is a positive affine transformation of u2, or that
u2 is a positive affine transformation of u1. Nevertheless, without loss of generality, we
can set u1 = u2. See also Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a, Section 3.3).
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4.1.2 Characterizations
Theorem 4.1 asserts that a decision-maker is less risk and uncertainty averse
than another if and only if her indifference buyer’s price and her indifference
seller’s price are smaller than for the the other at every level of constant
initial wealth. Analogous results in term of the indifference buyer’s price
were obtained by Pratt (1964) in the expected utility framework in relation
to the characterization of comparative risk aversion.
Theorem 4.1. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) Uu1,G1 is less risk and uncertainty averse than Uu2,G2.
(ii) piu1,G1w0 ≤ piu2,G2w0 for all w0 ∈ R.
(iii) ϕu1,G1w0 ≤ ϕu2,G2w0 for all w0 ∈ R.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let X ∈ X and x ∈ R.
(i) ⇔ (ii) By Definition 4.1 and Definition 3.1, Uu1,G1 : X → R is less risk
and uncertainty averse than Uu2,G2 : X → R if and only if,
u1(w0 + x) ≥ u1(w0 − piu1,G1w0 (X)) ⇒ u2(w0 + x) ≥ u2(w0 − piu2,G2w0 (X))
that is, since u1 : R→ R and u2 : R→ R are strictly increasing, if and only
if,
piu1,G1w0 (X) ≥ −x ⇒ piu2,G2w0 (X) ≥ −x
Thus, Uu1,G1 : X → R is less risk and uncertainty averse than Uu2,G2 : X →
R if and only if,
piu1,G1w0 (X) ≤ piu2,G2w0 (X).
(i)⇔ (iii) By Definition 4.1 and Definition 3.3, Uu1,G1 : X → R is less risk
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and uncertainty averse than Uu2,G2 : X → R if and only if,
Uu1,G1(w0 + x+X + ϕ
u1,G1
w0+x(X)) ≥ Uu1,G1(w0 +X) ⇒
Uu2,G2(w0 + x+X + ϕ
u2,G2
w0+x(X)) ≥ Uu2,G2(w0 +X)
that is, since Uu1,G1 : X → R and Uu2,G2 : X → R are strictly increasing, if
and only if,
ϕu1,G1w0+x(X) ≥ −x ⇒ ϕu2,G2w0+x(X) ≥ −x
Thus, Uu1,G1 : X → R is less risk and uncertainty averse than Uu2,G2 : X →
R if and only if,
ϕu1,G1w0+x(X) ≤ ϕu2,G2w0+x(X).
Corollary 4.1 provides the dual characterization of uncertainty aversion con-
sistent with Theorem 4.1 and with the representation results in Proposition
3.3 and Proposition 3.7.
Corollary 4.1. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) Uu1,G1 is less risk and uncertainty averse than Uu2,G2.
(ii) Ru1,G1w0 ≤ Ru2,G2w0 for all w0 ∈ R.
(iii) αu1,G1w0 ≥ αu2,G2w0 for all w0 ∈ R.
Proof of Corollary 4.1. (i) ⇔ (ii) By Remark 4.1, Uu1,G1 : X → R is less
risk and uncertainty averse than Uu2,G2 : X → R if and only if Au2,G2w0,m ⊆
Au1,G1w0,m for all m ∈ R. By Rockafellar (1970, Corollary 13.1.1),
Au2,G2w0,m ⊆ Au1,G1w0,m ⇔ ru2,G2w0 (m,Q) ≤ ru1,G1w0 (m,Q)
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for all (m,Q) ∈ R×∆. By Equation (3.7) and by the increasing monotonicity
of ru1,G1w0 : R×∆→ (−∞,+∞] and ru2,G2w0 : R×∆→ (−∞,+∞] in the first
argument,
ru2,G2w0 (m,Q) ≤ ru1,G1w0 (m,Q) ∀(m,Q) ∈ R×∆ ⇔
Ru1,G1w0 (x,Q) ≤ Ru2,G2w0 (x,Q) ∀(x,Q) ∈ R×∆
Thus, Uu1,G1 : X → R is less risk and uncertainty averse than Uu2,G2 : X →
R if and only if,
Ru1,G1w0 (x,Q) ≤ Ru2,G2w0 (x,Q)
for all (x,Q) ∈ R×∆.
(i) ⇔ (iii) By Theorem 4.1 and by Remark 3.3 Uu1,G1 : X → R is less risk
and uncertainty averse than Uu2,G2 : X → R if and only if Au2,G2w0−m,0 −m ⊆
Au1,G1w0−m,0 −m for all m ∈ R. By Rockafellar (1970, Corollary 13.1.1),
Au2,G2w0−m,0 −m ⊆ A
u1,G1
w0−m,0 −m ⇔ α
u2,G2
w0−m(Q)−m ≤ αu1,G1w0−m(Q)−m
for all m ∈ R and Q ∈ ∆. Thus, Uu1,G1 : X → R is less risk and uncertainty
averse than Uu2,G2 : X → R if and only if,
αu2,G2w0−m(Q) ≤ αu1,G1w0−m(Q)
for all m ∈ R and Q ∈ ∆.
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4.2 Increasing, Decreasing, and Constant Uncertainty Aver-
sion
In this section we study the comparison of the different extents of uncer-
tainty aversion of a given decision-maker at different levels of constant initial
wealth. In Section 4.2.1 we present a definition of increasing, decreasing, and
constant uncertainty aversion which is consistent with the definition of in-
creasing, decreasing, and constant risk aversion in Kreps (1988, Chapter 6,
page 75). In Section 4.2.2 we provide various characterizations of increasing,
decreasing, and constant uncertainty aversion in terms of the indifference
buyer’s price and of the indifference seller’s price introduced in Chapter 3.
Observe that, for simplicity, all the definitions and all the results are pro-
vided in terms of the more general notion of increasing, decreasing, and
constant risk and uncertainty aversion, and that all the definitions and all
the results which characterize increasing, decreasing, and constant uncer-
tainty aversion only will be recovered as particular cases under a suitable
normalization condition.
4.2.1 Definition
The notion of increasing, decreasing, and constant uncertainty aversion al-
lows to compare the different extents of uncertainty aversion of a given
decision-maker Uu,G : X → R at different levels of constant initial wealth
w1 ∈ R and w2 ∈ R. The intuition underlying the notion of increasing
uncertainty aversion is that if a decision-maker Uu,G : X → R prefers a
constant monetary payoff x ∈ R to a stochastic monetary payoff X ∈ X
when her constant initial wealth is w1 ∈ R, and if she still prefers the con-
stant monetary payoff x ∈ R when her constant initial wealth is increased
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to w2 ∈ R, then she is increasingly risk and uncertainty averse2.
Definition 4.2. A decision-maker Uu,G : X → R is said to be increasingly
risk and uncertainty averse if,
u(w1 + x) ≥ Uu,G(w1 +X) ⇒ u(w2 + x) ≥ Uu,G(w2 +X) (4.3)
for all X ∈ X , x ∈ R, and w1, w2 ∈ R such that w1 ≤ w2.
Note that the decision-maker Uu,G : X → R may still prefer the constant
monetary payoff x ∈ R when her constant initial wealth is increased to
w2 ∈ R either because she is increasingly risk averse, that is because she dis-
likes even more the variability of the outcomes of the stochastic monetary
payoff X ∈ X when her constant initial wealth is increased to w2 ∈ R, or
because she is increasingly uncertainty averse, that is because she dislikes
even more the fact that the probabilities of the different possible outcomes
of X ∈ X are not objectively determined when her constant initial wealth
is increased to w2 ∈ R. For this reason, Definition 4.2 is a definition of
increasing risk and uncertainty aversion, and not a definition of increasing
uncertainty aversion only.
For Definition 4.2 to specialize to increasing uncertainty aversion only, it is
necessary that the decision-maker Uu,G displays the same risk aversion at
different levels of constant initial wealth w1 ∈ R and w2 ∈ R, that is that
u : R → R is constantly absolute risk averse (CARA). This normalization
condition ensures, in fact, that the decision-maker’s different choices at dif-
ferent levels of constant initial wealth w1 ∈ R and w2 ∈ R are ascribable
only to the way in which her uncertainty aversion changes when her con-
2In fact, if this decision-maker Uu,G : X → R was decreasingly risk and uncertainty
averse, than at some high level constant initial wealth w2 ∈ R she would reverse her
preferences and choose the stochastic monetary payoff X ∈ X .
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stant initial wealth is increased from w1 ∈ R to w2 ∈ R, and not also to the
way in which her risk aversion changes when her constant initial wealth is
increased from w1 ∈ R to w2 ∈ R. Recall that the CARA utility functions
are the linear utility function u(x) = β + αx for all x ∈ R with β ∈ R and
α ∈ (0,+∞) and the exponential utility function u(x) = −αe−θx for all
x ∈ R with α, θ ∈ (0,+∞).
Remark 4.2. Definition 4.2 can be immediately characterized in terms of
the acceptance family (Au,Gw0,m)m∈R introduced in Section 3.1.1.3. In fact, it
follows directly from Definition 4.2 that a decision-maker Uu,G : X → R is
increasingly risk and uncertainty averse if and only if,
Au,Gw2,m ⊆ Au,Gw1,m (4.4)
for all m ∈ R and w1, w2 ∈ R such that w1 ≤ w2. Thus, an increasingly risk
and uncertainty averse decision-maker Uu,G : X → R prefers fewer stochastic
monetary payoffs X ∈ X to the constant monetary payoff −m ∈ R when
her constant initial wealth is increased from w1 ∈ R to w2 ∈ R.
Note that Uu,G is said to be decreasingly risk and uncertainty averse when
the implication in Equation (4.3) holds true in the opposite direction, and
that Uu,G is said to be constantly risk and uncertainty averse when the
implication in Equation (4.3) holds true in both directions. The same con-
siderations apply to the set inclusion in Remark 4.2.
4.2.2 Characterizations
Theorem 4.2 asserts that a decision-maker is increasingly risk and uncer-
tainty averse if and only if her indifference buyer’s price and her indifference
seller’s price are increasing functions of her constant initial wealth. Analo-
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gous results in term of the indifference buyer’s price were obtained by Pratt
(1964) in the expected utility framework in relation to the characterization
of increasing, decreasing, and constant risk aversion.
Theorem 4.2. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) Uu,G is increasingly risk and uncertainty averse.
(ii) piu,Gw1 ≤ piu,Gw2 for all w1, w2 ∈ R such that w1 ≤ w2.
(iii) ϕu,Gw1 ≤ ϕu,Gw2 for all w1, w2 ∈ R such that w1 ≤ w2.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Follows from applying the same arguments as in the
proof of Theorem 4.1 with Uu,G(w1 +X) = U
u1,G1(w0 +X) and U
u,G(w2 +
X) = Uu2,G2(w0 + X) for all X ∈ X and with w1, w2 ∈ R such that w1 ≤
w2.
Corollary 4.2 provides a dual characterization of uncertainty aversion con-
sistent with Theorem 4.2 and with the representation results of Proposition
3.3 and Proposition 3.7.
Corollary 4.2. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) Uu,G is increasingly risk and uncertainty averse.
(ii) Ru,Gw1 ≤ Ru,Gw2 for all w1, w2 ∈ R such that w1 ≤ w2.
(iii) αu,Gw1 ≥ αu,Gw2 for all w1, w2 ∈ R such that w1 ≤ w2.
Proof of Corollary 4.2. Follows from applying the same arguments as in the
proof of Corollary 4.1 with Au,Gw1,m = Au1,G1w0,m and Au,Gw2,m = Au2,G2w0,m for all
m ∈ R and with w1, w2 ∈ R such that w1 ≤ w2.
4.2.3 Further Characterizations
This section illustrates some further characterizations of increasing, decreas-
ing and constant risk and uncertainty aversion which do not rely on the
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dependence of the indifference buyer’s price piu,Gw0 : X → R and of the indif-
ference seller’s price ϕu,Gw0 : X → R on the decision-maker’s constant initial
wealth w0 ∈ R. The characterization results presented in this section rely
instead on the observation that the notion of increasing, decreasing, or con-
stant risk and uncertainty aversion describes how a decision-maker’s choice
between an uncertain monetary payoff X ∈ X and a constant monetary
payoff x ∈ R is altered if a positive constant amount of money m ∈ [0,+∞)
is added to both alternatives.
Proposition 4.1. A decision-maker Uu,G : X → R is increasingly risk and
uncertainty averse if and only if,
u(w0 + x) ≥ Uu,G(w0 +X) ⇒ u(w0 + x+m) ≥ Uu,G(w0 +X +m) (4.5)
for all m ∈ [0,+∞), X ∈ X , x ∈ R, and w0 ∈ R.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Follows from Definition 4.2 taking w1 = w0 ∈ R
and setting w2 = w0 +m ∈ R with m ∈ [0,+∞).
Proposition 4.2 shows that Proposition 4.1 can be equivalently characterized
in terms of the acceptance family (Au,Gw0,m)m∈R.
Proposition 4.2. A decision-maker Uu,G : X → R is increasingly risk and
uncertainty averse if and only if,
Au,Gw0,m ⊆ Au,Gw0,m+n + n (4.6)
for all m ∈ R, n ∈ [0,+∞) and w0 ∈ R.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Let X ∈ X and m ∈ R. By Proposition 4.1 Uu,G :
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X → R is increasingly risk and uncertainty averse if and only if,
u(w0 −m) ≥ Uu,G(w0 +X) ⇒ u(w0 −m− n) ≥ Uu,G(w0 +X − n)
for all n ∈ (−∞, 0], that is, if and only if,
Au,Gw0,m ⊇ Au,Gw0,m+n + n
for all n ∈ (−∞, 0]. Thus, Uu,G : X → R is increasingly risk and uncertainty
averse if and only if,
Au,Gw0,m ⊆ Au,Gw0,m+n + n
for all n ∈ [0,+∞).
Note that decreasing risk and uncertainty aversion is obtained reversing
the direction of the implication in Equation (4.5), and that constant risk
and uncertainty aversion is obtained when the implication in Equation (4.5)
applies in both directions. The same considerations apply to the set inclusion
in Equation (4.6).
4.2.3.1 Cash-Subadditivity
As a consequence of Proposition 4.1, increasing, decreasing and constant
risk and uncertainty aversion are equivalently characterized by the additive
properties that the indifference buyer’s price piu,Gw0 : X → R satisfies with
respect to the positive constant monetary payoffs m ∈ [0,+∞) for any given
w0 ∈ R.
Theorem 4.3. A decision-maker Uu,G : X → R is increasingly risk and
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uncertainty averse if and only if,
piu,Gw0 (X +m) ≥ piu,Gw0 (X)−m (4.7)
for all m ∈ [0,+∞), X ∈ X , and w0 ∈ R.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Let X ∈ X , x ∈ R and m ∈ [0,+∞). By Proposition
4.1 and Definition 3.1 Uu,G : X → R is increasingly risk and uncertainty
averse if and only if,
u(w0 + x) ≥ u(w0−piu,Gw0 (X)) ⇒
u(w0 +m+ x) ≥ u(w0 − piu,Gw0 (X +m))
or, equivalently, as u : R→ R is strictly increasing, if and only if,
piu,Gw0 (X) ≥ −x ⇒ piu,Gw0 (X +m) +m ≥ −x
Thus, Uu,G : X → R is increasingly risk and uncertainty averse if and only
if,
piu,Gw0 (X +m) ≥ piu,Gw0 (X)−m.
Theorem 4.3 asserts that a decision-maker Uu,G : X → R is increasingly
risk and uncertainty averse if and only if the indifference buyer’s price
piu,Gw0 : X → R is cash-subadditive. It follows from Proposition 3.1 that
the indifference buyer’s price of an increasingly risk and uncertainty averse
decision-maker is a cash-subadditive quasiconvex risk measure. The property
of cash-subadditivity was introduced in the mathematical finance literature
by El Karoui and Ravanelli (2009) to model the impact of default risk and
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interest rate ambiguity on the minimal reserve amount that must be added
to an uncertain monetary payoff such that it becomes acceptable to a fi-
nancial regulator or supervisory agency. The property of cash-subadditivity
is a weakening of the property of cash-additivity considered by Deprez and
Gerber (1985), Frittelli and Rosazza Gianin (2002), and Fo¨llmer and Schied
(2002).
It follows from Theorem 4.3 implies that Uu,G : X → R is decreasingly risk
and uncertainty averse if and only if,
piu,Gw0 (X +m) ≤ piu,Gw0 (X)−m (4.8)
for all m ∈ [0,+∞) and X ∈ X , that is if and only if piu,Gw0 : X → R is
a cash-superadditive quasiconvex risk measure, and that Uu,G : X → R is
constantly risk and uncertainty averse if and only if,
piu,Gw0 (X +m) = pi
u,G
w0 (X)−m (4.9)
for all m ∈ R and X ∈ X , that is if and only if piu,Gw0 : X → R is a cash-
additive convex risk measure (see Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2010, Proposition
2.1)). In the framework of expected utility preferences Uu,Q : X → R
the characterization of constant risk aversion in terms of cash-additivity of
the indifference buyer’s price piu,Qw0 : X → R is a direct consequence of the
Nagumo-Kolmogorov-de Finetti Theorem (see de Finetti (1931)).
Corollary 4.3 provides a dual characterization of increasing risk and uncer-
tainty aversion consistent with Theorem 4.3 and with the representation
result of Proposition 3.3. Proposition 4.3 is a direct application of Proposi-
tion 2.11 in Drapeau and Kupper (2010).
Corollary 4.3. A decision-maker Uu,G : X → R is increasingly risk and
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uncertainty averse if and only if,
Ru,Gw0 (x−m,Q) ≥ Ru,Gw0 (x,Q)−m (4.10)
for all m ∈ [0,+∞), (x,Q) ∈ R×∆, and w0 ∈ R.
The different additive properties of the indifference buyer’s price piu,Gw0 : X →
R described by Equation (4.7), Equation (4.8), and Equation (4.9), allow to
immediately establish various inequalities between the indifference buyer’s
price piu,Gw0 : X → R and the indifference seller’s price ϕu,Gw0 : X → R. The
derivation of the various inequalities is based on the useful result of Lemma
4.1.
Lemma 4.1. The indifference buyer’s price piu,Gw0 : X → R satisfies,
piu,Gw0 (X + ϕ
u,G
w0 (X)) = 0 (4.11)
for all X ∈ X and w0 ∈ R.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Let X ∈ X . By Definition 3.1 and Definition 3.3,
u(w0 − piu,Gw0 (X + ϕu,Gw0 (X))) = Uu,G(w0 +X + ϕu,Gw0 (X)) = u(w0)
and the strict monotonicity of u : R→ R yields piu,Gw0 (X+ϕu,Gw0 (X)) = 0.
Lemma 4.1, combined with Theorem 4.3, allows to characterize increasing,
decreasing, and constant risk and uncertainty aversion in terms of the in-
equalities fulfilled by the indifference buyer’s price piu,Gw0 : X → R and by the
indifference seller’s price ϕu,Gw0 : X → R for every w0 ∈ R.
Theorem 4.4. A decision-maker Uu,G : X → R is increasingly risk and
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uncertainty averse if and only if,
piu,Gw0 (X) ≤ ϕu,Gw0 (X) (4.12)
for all X ∈ X such that ϕu,Gw0 (X) ∈ [0,+∞).
Proof of Theorem 4.4. By Theorem 4.3 and Lemma 4.1 Uu,G : X → R is
increasingly risk and uncertainty averse if and only if,
0 = piu,Gw0 (X + ϕ
u,G
w0 (X)) ≥ piu,Gw0 (X)− ϕu,Gw0 (X)
for all X ∈ X such that ϕu,Gw0 (X) ∈ [0,+∞).
It follows from Theorem 4.4 that Uu,G : X → R is decreasingly risk and
uncertainty averse if and only if,
piu,Gw0 (X) ≥ ϕu,Gw0 (X) (4.13)
for all X ∈ X such that ϕu,Gw0 (X) ∈ [0,+∞), and that Uu,G : X → R is
constantly risk and uncertainty averse if and only if,
piu,Gw0 (X) = ϕ
u,G
w0 (X) (4.14)
for all X ∈ X .
Lemma 4.2 provides a dual characterization of Lemma 4.1 in terms of the
maximal risk function Ru,Gw0 : R×∆→ [−∞,+∞) and of the minimal penalty
function αu,Gw0 : ∆→ (−∞,+∞].
Lemma 4.2. The maximal risk function Ru,Gw0 : R×∆→ [−∞,+∞) satis-
fies,
Ru,Gw0 (x,Q) ≤ 0
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for all (x,Q) ∈ R×∆ such that x ≤ αu,Gw0 (Q).
Proof of Lemma 4.2. By the increasing monotonicity of Ru,Gw0 : R × ∆ →
[−∞,+∞) in its first argument, by Equation (3.6), and by Lemma 4.1,
Ru,Gw0 (x,Q) ≤ Ru,Gw0 (EQ[−X]−ϕu,Gw0 (X), Q)
≤ sup
Q∈∆
Ru,Gw0 (EQ[−X]− ϕu,Gw0 (X), Q)
= 0
for all (x,Q) ∈ R ×∆ such that x ≤ EQ[−X] − ϕu,Gw0 (X) for some X ∈ X ,
that is for all (x,Q) ∈ R×∆ such that,
x ≤ sup
X∈X
(
EQ[−X]− ϕu,Gw0 (X)
)
= sup
X∈Au,Gw0,0
EQ[−X]
= αu,Gw0 (Q)
See also Remark 4.16 point (a) in Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004). Thus, R(x,Q) ≤
0 for all (x,Q) ∈ R×∆ such that x ≤ αu,Gw0 (Q).
Lemma 4.2, combined with Corollary 4.3, allows to characterize increasing,
decreasing and constant risk and uncertainty aversion in terms of the in-
equalities that maximal risk function Ru,Gw0 : R × ∆ → [−∞,+∞) and the
minimal penalty function αu,Gw0 : ∆→ (−∞,+∞] fulfill for every w0 ∈ R.
Corollary 4.4. A decision-maker Uu,G : X → R is increasingly risk and
uncertainty averse if and only if,
Ru,Gw0 (x,Q) ≤ x− αu,Gw0 (Q) (4.15)
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for all (x,Q) ∈ R×∆ such that x ≥ αu,Gw0 (Q).
Proof. By Lemma 4.2 and Corollary 4.3 Uu,G : X → R is increasingly risk
and uncertainty averse if and only if,
0 ≥ Ru,Gw0 (x− (x− αu,Gw0 (Q)), Q) ≥ Ru,Gw0 (x,Q)− x+ αu,Gw0 (Q)
for all (x,Q) ∈ R × ∆ such that x ≥ αu,Gw0 (Q). Thus, Uu,G : X → R is
increasingly risk and uncertainty averse if and only if,
Ru,Gw0 (x,Q) ≤ x− αu,Gw0 (Q)
for all (x,Q) ∈ R×∆ such that x ≥ αu,Gw0 (Q)
4.2.3.2 Star-Shapedness
The uncertainty indexes G : R × ∆ → (−∞,+∞] that are minimally and
maximally uncertainty averse consistently with the notion of comparative
uncertainty aversion described in Section 4.1 have already been characterized
by Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a, Section 3.3) who found that a decision-
maker Uu1,G1 : X → R is more uncertainty averse than another Uu2,G2 :
X → R if and only if,
G1 ≤ G2
provided that u1 = u2 : R → R. Theorem 4.5 characterizes the uncer-
tainty indexes G : R ×∆ → (−∞,+∞] that are increasingly, decreasingly,
and constantly uncertainty averse accordingly with the notion of increas-
ing, decreasing and constant uncertainty aversion described in Section 4.2.
The proof of Theorem 4.5 exploits the characterization of a decision-maker’s
increasing, decreasing, and constant risk and uncertainty aversion in Theo-
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rem 4.3 under the normalization condition that the decision-maker’s utility
function is constantly absolute risk averse (see Subsection 4.1.1).
Theorem 4.5. A decision-maker Uu,G : X → R is increasingly uncertainty
averse if and only if,
G(λx+m,P ) ≤ λG(x, P ) +m
for all λ ∈ (0, 1], m ∈ [0,+∞), and (x, P ) ∈ R×∆, decreasingly uncertainty
averse if and only if,
G(λx+m,P ) ≥ λG(x, P ) +m
for all λ ∈ (0, 1], m ∈ [0,+∞), and (x, P ) ∈ R ×∆, and constantly uncer-
tainty averse if and only if,
G(λx+m,P ) = λG(x, P ) +m
for all λ ∈ (0,+∞), m ∈ R, and (x, P ) ∈ R×∆.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. The indifference buyer’s price piL,Gw0 : X → R defined
in terms of the linear utility function u(x) = β+αx for all x ∈ R with β ∈ R
and α ∈ (0,+∞) is given by,
piL,Gw0 (X) = w0 +
β
α
− 1
α
inf
P∈∆
G(β + αw0 + αEP [X], P ) (4.16)
for all X ∈ X and w0 ∈ R. By Drapeau and Kupper (2010, Proposition 2.11)
the function piL,G0 : X → R in Equation (4.16) is cash-subadditive if and only
if G(x+m,P ) ≤ G(x, P ) +m for all m ∈ [0,+∞), cash-superadditive if and
only if G(x+m,P ) ≥ G(x, P ) +m for all m ∈ [0,+∞), and cash-additive if
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and only if G(x+m,P ) = G(x, P ) +m for all m ∈ R.
The indifference buyer’s price piE,Gw0 : X → R defined in terms of the expo-
nential utility function u(x) = −αe−θx for all x ∈ R with α, θ ∈ (0,+∞) is
given by,
piE,Gw0 (X) = w0 +
1
θ
ln
(
− 1
α
inf
P∈∆
G(EP [−αe−θ(w0+X)], P )
)
(4.17)
for all X ∈ X and w0 ∈ R. By Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2010, Proposition
4.1) the function piE,G0 : X → R in Equation (4.17) is cash-subadditive if
and only if G(λx, P ) ≤ λG(x, P ) for all λ ∈ (0, 1], cash-superadditive if and
only if G(λx, P ) ≥ λG(x, P ) for all λ ∈ (0, 1], and cash-additive if and only
if G(λx, P ) = λG(x, P ) for all λ ∈ (0,+∞).
It follows that piL,Gw0 : X → R and piE,Gw0 : X → R are cash-subadditive if and
only if G(λx+m,P ) ≤ λG(x, P )+m for all λ ∈ (0, 1] and m ∈ [0,+∞), cash-
superadditive if and only ifG(λx+m,P ) ≥ λG(x, P )+m for all λ ∈ (0, 1] and
m ∈ [0,+∞), and cash-additive if and only if G(λx+m,P ) = λG(x, P )+m
for all λ ∈ (0,+∞) and m ∈ R.
Thus, the statement follows from Theorem 4.3, together with the normal-
ization condition that the decision-maker’s utility function is either linear
or exponential discussed in Section 4.2.
Theorem 4.5 asserts that a decision-maker Uu,G : X → R is increasingly un-
certainty averse if and only if her uncertainty index G : R×∆→ (−∞,+∞]
is star-shaped3 and cash-subadditive. The property of star-shapedness was
introduced in the mathematical finance literature by Cerreia Vioglio et al.
(2010) to model the impact of liquidity risk on the minimal reserve amount
that must be added to an uncertain monetary payoff such that it becomes
3A function h : R→ R is said to be star-shaped if h(λx) ≤ λh(x) for all λ ∈ (0, 1] and
x ∈ R.
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acceptable to a financial regulator or supervisory agency. The property of
star-shapedness is a weakening of the property of positive homogeneity4 con-
sidered by Artzner et al. (1999) and Delbaen (2002).
The characterization of increasing, decreasing, and constant uncertainty
aversion in Theorem 4.5 allows to easily classify the different possible spec-
ifications of the uncertainty averse representation of preferences of Cerreia
Vioglio et al. (2011a) into increasingly, decreasingly, and constantly uncer-
tainty averse.
Example 4.1. By Theorem 4.5, the variational representation of prefer-
ences Uu,c : X → R of Maccheroni et al. (2006) is decreasingly uncer-
tainty averse. In fact, as c(P ) ≥ 0 for all P ∈ ∆, the uncertainty index
G : R×∆→ (−∞,+∞] in Equation (2.4) satisfies,
G(λx+m,P ) = λx+m+ c(P )
≥ λx+m+ λc(P )
= λG(x, P ) +m
for all λ ∈ (0, 1], m ∈ R, and (x, P ) ∈ R×∆.
Example 4.2. The multiplier representation of preferences Uu,θ,R,Q : X →
R of Hansen and Sargent (2001) and Strzalecki (2011) is a particular case
of the variational representation of preferences of Maccheroni et al. (2006)
which is obtained when,
c(P ) = θR(P ||Q)
for all P ∈ ∆ where θ ∈ (0,+∞) and R(. ||Q) : ∆→ [0,+∞] is the relative
entropy with respect to Q ∈ ∆σ (see Subsection 2.3.2). Thus, the multiplier
4A function h : R → R is said to be positively homogeneous if h(λx) = λh(x) for all
λ ∈ (0,+∞) and x ∈ R.
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representation of preferences Uu,θ,R,Q : X → R is decreasingly uncertainty
averse.
Example 4.3. By Theorem 4.5, the multiple priors representation of pref-
erences Uu,P : X → R of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) is constantly
uncertainty averse. In fact, as for every P ∈ ∆ either δ(P | P) = 0 or
δ(P | P) = +∞, the uncertainty index G : R×∆→ (−∞,+∞] in Equation
(2.8) satisfies,
G(λx+m,P ) = λx+m+ δ(P | P)
= λx+m+ λδ(P | P)
= λG(x, P ) +m
for all λ ∈ (0,+∞), m ∈ R, and (x, P ) ∈ R×∆.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this dissertation we studied the problem of indifference pricing in the gen-
eral decision-theoretic framework of uncertainty averse preferences (Cerreia
Vioglio et al. (2011a)).
In the first part of the dissertation we studied the preferences that an uncer-
tainty averse decision-maker expresses through her indifference prices and
we found that they are consistent with the basic principles of rationality and
diversification (see Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2010)). We found, in particular,
that the indifference buyer’s price is a quasiconvex risk measure, and that
the indifference seller’s price is a cash-additive convex risk measure. We
found that the acceptance family of the indifference buyer’s price as well
as the acceptance set of the indifference seller’s price are completely char-
acterized by the decision-maker’s uncertainty averse preferences and by the
decision-maker’s constant initial wealth. We found that, as a result, the
maximal risk function representing the indifference buyer’s price as well as
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the minimal penalty function representing the indifference seller’s price are
completely described by the decision-maker’s uncertainty averse preferences
and by the decision-maker’s constant initial wealth. We provided explicit
expressions for the maximal risk function and for the minimal penalty func-
tions representing the indifference buyer’s price and the indifference seller’s
price defined by the variational (Maccheroni et al. (2006)), the multiplier
(Hansen and Sargent (2001), Strzalecki (2011)), and the multiple priors
(Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)) representations of preferences.
In the second part of the dissertation we studied the different extents of
uncertainty aversion that a decision-maker’s expresses through her indiffer-
ence prices. We showed that a decision-maker is more (respectively, less)
uncertainty averse than another if and only if her indifference prices are
pointwise larger (respectively, smaller) than the other’s, and that a decision
is as uncertainty averse as another if and only if her indifference prices are
pointwise equal to the other’s. We also showed that a decision-maker is
increasingly (respectively, decreasingly) uncertainty averse if and only if her
indifference prices are increasing (respectively, decreasing) functions of her
constant initial wealth, and that a decision is constantly uncertainty averse
if and only if her indifference prices are constant functions of her constant
initial wealth.
We found that a decision-maker is increasingly (respectively, decreasingly)
uncertainty averse if and only if her indifference buyer’s price is a cash-
subadditive (respectively, cash-superadditive) quasiconvex risk measure, and
constantly uncertainty averse if and only her indifference buyer’s price is a
cash-additive convex risk measure. We found that a decision-maker is in-
creasingly (respectively, decreasingly) uncertainty averse if and only if her
indifference buyer’s price is less than (respectively, greater than) her indiffer-
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ence seller’s price whenever the latter is positive, and constantly uncertainty
averse if and only if her indifference buyer’s price is equal to her indifference
seller’s price irrespective of whether the latter is positive or negative.
In the last part of the dissertation we derived a technical condition on the
uncertainty index appearing in the uncertainty averse representation of pref-
erences of Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a) which allows to easily classify the
various particular specifications of the uncertainty averse representation of
preferences of Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a) into increasingly, decreasingly,
and constantly uncertainty averse. We found that the variational (Mac-
cheroni et al. (2006)) and, as a result, the multiplier (Hansen and Sargent
(2001), Strzalecki (2011)), representations of preferences are decreasingly
uncertainty averse, and that the multiple priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989)) representation of preferences is constantly uncertainty averse.
Further research might investigate the extension of the analysis of this dis-
sertation to a framework of optimal risk exchange. The problem of opti-
mal risk exchange was studied by Borch (1962), Arrow (1963), and Gerber
(1978) in the expected utility framework. The study of the problem of op-
timal risk exchange was extended by Barrieu and El-Karoui (2005), Jouini
et al. (2008) and Filipovic and Kupper (2008) to a more general framework
in which the relevant decision-makers evaluate the relative desirability of
alternative uncertain monetary endowments by cash-additive convex risk
measures. The study of the problem of optimal risk exchange was further
developed by Acciaio (2007), who considered decision-makers with concave
objective functions which are cash-additive but not necessarily monotone,
and by El Karoui and Ravanelli (2009), who considered decision-makers with
concave objective functions which are cash-subadditive and monotone. The
solution of the problem of optimal risk exchange was characterized under
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even less restrictive assumptions by Ravanelli and Svindland (2011) who
considered decision-makers with objective functions which are only concave
and monotone.
All the objective functions previously employed in the literature on optimal
risk exchange, with the exception of the non-monotone functions considered
by Acciaio (2007), are particular cases of the uncertainty averse representa-
tion of preferences of Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a) and, as shown in Section
4.2.3.2 of this dissertation, they can be classified based on whether they
exhibit increasing, decreasing, or constant uncertainty aversion. Thus, fu-
ture work might investigate the existence and the characterization and the
solution of the problem of optimal risk exchange in the general framework
of uncertainty averse preferences of Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a) and, along
the lines of this dissertation, it might examine how the equilibrium depends
on the different attitudes toward uncertainty of the decision-makers involved
in the exchange.
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